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A central feature of dynamic collective decision-making is that the rules that govern the procedures
for future decision-making and the distribution of political power across players are determined by
current decisions. For example, current constitutional change must take into account how the new
constitution may pave the way for further changes in laws and regulations. We develop a general framework
for the analysis of this class of dynamic problems. Under relatively natural acyclicity assumptions,
we provide a complete characterization of dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state
and determine conditions for their uniqueness. We show how this framework can be applied in political
economy, coalition formation, and the analysis of the dynamics of clubs. The explicit characterization
we provide highlights two intuitive features of dynamic collective decision-making: (1) a social arrangement
is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently many
members of the society; (2) efficiency-enhancing changes are often resisted because of further social
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Consider the problem of a society choosing its constitution. Naturally, the current rewards
from adopting a speciﬁc constitution will inﬂuence this decision. But, as long as the members
of the society are forward-looking and patient, the future implications of the constitution may
be even more important. For example, a constitution that encourages economic activity and
beneﬁts the majority of the population may nonetheless create future instability or leave room
for a minority to seize political control. If so, the society–or the majority of its members–may
rationally shy away from adopting such a constitution. Many problems in political economy,
club theory, coalition formation, organizational economics, and industrial organization have a
structure resembling this example of constitutional choice.
We develop a general framework for the analysis of dynamic group-decision-making over
constitutions, coalitions, and clubs. Formally, we consider a society consisting of a ﬁnite number
of inﬁnitely-lived individuals. The society starts in a particular state, which can be thought of
as the constitution of the society, regulating how economic and political decisions are made. It
determines stage payoﬀs and also how the society can determine its future states (constitutions),
for example, which subsets of individuals can change the constitution. Our focus is on (Markov
perfect) equilibria of this dynamic game when individuals are suﬃciently forward-looking. Under
natural acyclicity assumptions, which rule out Condorcet-type cycles, we prove the existence and
characterize the structure of (dynamically) stable states,w h i c ha r ed e ﬁned as states that arise
and persist. An equilibrium is represented by a mapping φ, which designates the dynamically
stable state φ(s0) as a function of the initial state s0. We show that the set of dynamically
stable states is largely independent of the details of agenda-setting and voting protocols.
Although our main focus is the analysis of the noncooperative game outlined in the previous
paragraph, we ﬁrst start with an axiomatic characterization of stable states. This character-
ization relies on the observation that suﬃciently forward-looking individuals will not wish to
support change towards a state (constitution) that might ultimately lead to another, less pre-
ferred state. This observation is encapsulated in a simple stability axiom. We also introduce two
other natural axioms ensuring that individuals do not support changes that will give them lower
utility. We characterize the set of mappings, Φ, that are consistent with these three axioms and
provide conditions under which there exists a unique φ ∈ Φ (Theorem 1). Even when Φ is not
a singleton, the sets of stable states according to any two φ1,φ 2 ∈ Φ are identical.
Our main results are given in Theorem 2. This theorem shows that for any agenda-setting and
voting protocol the equilibria of the dynamic game we outline can be represented by some φ ∈ Φ
and that for any φ ∈ Φ, there exists a protocol such that the equilibrium will be represented
1by φ.1 This means that starting with initial state s0, any equilibrium leads to a dynamically
stable state φ(s0) for some φ ∈ Φ. Naturally, when such φ is unique, all equilibria result in the
uniquely-deﬁned dynamically stable φ(s0).
An attractive feature of this analysis is that the set of dynamically stable states can be
characterized recursively. This characterization is not only simple (the set of dynamically stable
states can be computed using induction), but it also emphasizes a fundamental insight: a par-
ticular state is dynamically stable only if there does not exist another state that is dynamically
stable and is preferred by a set of players that form a winning coalition within the current state.
At the center of our approach is the natural lack of commitment in dynamic decision-making
problems–those that gain additional decision-making power as a result of a reform cannot
commit to refraining from further choices that would hurt the initial set of decision-makers.
This lack of commitment, together with forward-looking behavior, is at the root of the general
characterization result provided in these theorems. It also leads to two simple intuitive results:
1. A particular social arrangement (constitution, coalition, or club) is made stable not by
the absence of a powerful set of players that prefer another alternative, but because of the
absence of an alternative stable arrangement that is preferred by a suﬃciently powerful
constituency. To understand why certain social arrangements are stable, we must thus
study the instabilities that changes away from these arrangements would unleash.2
2. Dynamically stable states can be ineﬃcient–in the sense that they may be Pareto domi-
nated by the payoﬀs in another state.
Our ﬁnal general result, Theorem 3, provides suﬃcient conditions for the acyclicity assump-
tions in Theorems 1 and 2 to hold when states belong to an ordered set (e.g., when they are a
subset of R). In particular, it shows that these results apply when (static) preferences satisfy a
single-crossing property or are single peaked (and some minimal assumptions on the structure
of winning coalitions are satisﬁed). This theorem makes our main results easy to apply in a
variety of environments. We also show that Theorems 1 and 2 apply in a range of situations in
which states do not belong to an ordered set.
The next two examples provide simple illustrations of the dynamic trade-oﬀs emphasized by
our approach.
1An additional assumption in the analysis of this game is that there is a transaction cost incurred by all
individuals every time there is a change in the state. This assumption is used to prove the existence of a
pure-strategy equilibrium and to rule out cycles without imposing stronger assumptions on preferences (see also
Examples 3 and 4 in Appendix C).
2This result also shows that, in contrast to Riker’s (1962) emphasis in the context of political coalition formation
games, the equilibrium will typically not involve a “minimum winning coalition,” because the state corresponding
to this coalition is generally unstable.
2Example 1 (Ineﬃcient Inertia) Consider a society consisting of two individuals, E and M.
E represents the elite and initially holds power, and M corresponds to the middle class. There
are three states: (1) absolutist monarchy a,i nw h i c hE rules, with no checks and no political
rights for M; (2) constitutional monarchy c,i nw h i c hM has greater security and is willing to
invest; (3) democracy d,w h e r eM becomes more inﬂuential and the privileges of E disappear.
Suppose that stage payoﬀs satisfy
wE (d) <w E (a) <w E (c), and wM (a) <w M (c) <w M (d).
In particular, wE (a) <w E (c) means that E has higher payoﬀ under constitutional monarchy
than under absolutist monarchy, for example, because greater investments by M increase tax
revenues. M clearly prefers democracy to constitutional monarchy and is least well-oﬀ under
absolutist monarchy. Both parties discount the stage payoﬀs with discount factor β ∈ (0,1).A s
described above, “states” not only determine payoﬀs but also specify decision rules. In absolutist
monarchy, E decides which regime will prevail tomorrow. To simplify the discussion, suppose
that starting in both regimes c and d, M decides next period’s regime. In terms of the notation
introduced above, this implies that d is a dynamically stable state, and φ(d)=d. In contrast, c
is not a dynamically stable state, since starting from c, there will be a transition to d and thus
φ(c)=d. Therefore, if, starting in regime a, E chooses a reform towards c,t h i sw i l ll e a dt od





In contrast, if E decides to stay in a forever, its payoﬀ is UE (no reform)=wE (a)/(1 − β).I f
β is suﬃciently small, then UE (no reform) <U E (reform), and reform will take place. However,
when players are forward looking and β is large, then UE (no reform) >U E (reform).I n t h i s
case, the unique dynamically stable state starting with a is a–that is, φ(a)=a.
This example, when players are suﬃciently forward-looking, illustrates both of the intuitive
results mentioned above. First, state a is made stable by the instability of another state, c,t h a t
is preferred by those who are powerful in a. Second, both E and M would be strictly better oﬀ
in c than in a,s ot h es t a b l es t a t es t a r t i n gf r o ma is Pareto ineﬃcient. It also illustrates another
general insight: the set of stable states is larger when players are forward-looking (when β is
small, only d is stable, whereas when β is large, both a and d are stable).
A similar game can be used to model the implications of concessions in wars. For example, a
concession that increases the payoﬀs to both warring parties may not take place because it will
change the future balance of power. It could also be used to illustrate how organizations might
act “conservatively” and resist eﬃciency-enhancing restructuring. For instance, the appointment
3of a CEO who would increase the value of the ﬁr mm a yn o tb ef a v o r e db yt h eb o a r do fd i r e c t o r s
if they forecast that the CEO would then become powerful and reduce their privileges.3
Example 2 (Voting in Clubs) Consider the problem of voting in clubs. The society consisting
of N individuals. A club is a subset of the society. Each individual i receives a stage payoﬀ
wi (st), which is as a function of the current club st, and current club members decide (according
to some voting rule) tomorrow’s club st+1. The seminal unpublished paper by Roberts (1999)
studies a special case of this environment, where individuals are ordered, i =1 ,2,...,N,a n y
club st must take the form xk = {1,...,k} for some k =1 ,2,..,N, and decisions are made by
majoritarian voting. Under a range of additional assumptions Roberts establishes the existence
of mixed-strategy (Markovian) equilibria and characterizes some of their properties. Our model
nests a more general version of this environment and enables us to establish the existence of
a unique dynamically stable club (and a pure-strategy equilibrium) under weaker conditions.
In addition, our approach allows a complete characterization of dynamically stable states and
clariﬁes the reasons for potential Pareto ineﬃciency.
T h e s ee x a m p l e si l l u s t r a t es o m eo ft h ep o s s i b le applications of our approach. We view the
rich set of environments that are covered by our model and the relative simplicity of the resulting
dynamic stable states as its major advantages. Both our speciﬁc results and the general ideas can
be applied to a range of problems in political economy, organizational economics, club theory,
and other areas. Some of these additional examples are discussed in Section 6.
On the theoretical side, Roberts (1999) and Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) can be
viewed as the most important precursors to our paper. Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001)
study a dynamic game of club formation in which any member of the club can unilaterally admit
a new agent. The recent ambitious paper by Lagunoﬀ (2006), which constructs a general model
of political reform and relates reform to the time-inconsistency of induced social rules, is another
precursor. Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2000, 2006a) and Lizzeri and Persico’s (2004) analyses of
franchise extension and Barbera and Jackson’s (2004) model of constitutional stability are on
related themes as well. How these papers can be viewed as applications of our general framework
is discussed in Section 6.
The two papers most closely related to our work are Chwe (1994) and Gomes and Jehiel
3Ideas related to this example have been discussed in a number of diﬀerent contexts. Robinson (1997) and
Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) discuss how a dictator or an oligarchy may refrain from providing productive
public goods or from educational investments, because they may be afraid of losing power. Rajan and Zingales
(2000) also emphasize similar ideas and apply them in the context of organizations. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006a) construct a dynamic model in which the elite may block technological improvements or institutional
reforms, because they will destabilize the existing regime. Fearon (1996, 2004) and Powell (1998) discuss similar
ideas in the context of civil wars and international wars, respectively.
4(2005). Chwe studies a model where payoﬀs are determined by states and there are exogenous
rules governing transitions from one state to another. Chwe demonstrates the relationship
between two distinct notions from cooperative game theory, the consistent and stable sets.
However, in Chwe’s setup, neither a noncooperative analysis nor characterization results are
possible, while such results are at the heart of our paper. The link between Chwe’s consistent
sets and our dynamically stable states is discussed further below. Gomes and Jehiel study a
related environment with side payments. They show that a player may sacriﬁce his instantaneous
payoﬀ to improve his bargaining position for the future, which is related to the unwillingness
of winning coalitions to make transitions to non-stable states in our paper. They also show
that equilibrium may be ineﬃcient when the discount factor is small. In contrast, in our game
Pareto dominated outcomes are not only possible in general, but they may emerge as unique
equilibria and are more likely when discount factors are large (as illustrated by Example 1).
More generally, we also provide a full set of characterization (and uniqueness) results, which are
not present in Gomes and Jehiel (and in fact, with side payments, we suspect that such results
are not possible). Finally, in our paper a dynamically stable state depends on the initial state,
while in Gomes and Jehiel, as the discount factor tends to 1, there is “ergodicity” in the sense
that the ultimate distribution of states does not depend on the initial state.
Finally, our work is also related to the literature on club theory (see, for example, Buchanan,
1956, Ellickson et al., 1999, Scotchmer, 2001). While early work in this area was static, a number
of recent papers have investigated the dynamics of club formation. In addition to Roberts
(1999) and Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001), which were discussed above, some of the
important papers in this area include Burkart and Wallner (2000), who develop an incomplete
contracts theory of club enlargement, and Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001), who show that the
requirement of a majority consent for admission to a jurisdiction may not be more restrictive
than an unrestricted right to migrate. Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2005) apply a simpliﬁed
version of Roberts’s model to the enlargement of the EU and Bordignon and Brusco (2003)
study the role of “enhanced cooperation agreements” in the dynamics of EU enlargement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general environment.
Section 3 motivates and presents our axiomatic analysis, which also acts as a preparation for
our noncooperative analysis. In Section 4, we prove the existence of a (pure-strategy) Markov
perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game for any agenda setting and voting protocol and estab-
lish the equivalence between these equilibria and the axiomatic characterization in Section 3.
Section 5 shows how the results of Sections 3—4 can be applied when states belong to an ordered
set. Section 6 discusses a range of applications of our framework, including the two examples
presented above. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A presents the main proofs omitted from the
5text. Appendix B and C, which are not for publication, contain a number of generalizations,
additional results, examples, and some omitted proofs.
2 Environment
There is a ﬁnite set of players I. Time is discrete and inﬁnite, indexed by t (t ≥ 1). There
is a ﬁnite set of states w h i c hw ed e n o t eb yS. Throughout the paper, |X| denotes the number
of elements of set X,s o|I| and |S| denote the number of individuals and states, respectively.
States represent both diﬀerent institutions aﬀecting players’ payoﬀs and procedures for decision-
making (e.g., the identity of the ruling coalition in power, the degree of supermajority, or the
w e i g h t so rp o w e r so fd i ﬀerent agents). Although our game is one of non-transferable utility, a
limited amount of transfers can also be incorporated by allowing multiple (but a ﬁnite set of)
states that have the same procedure for decision-making but diﬀerent payoﬀsa c r o s sp l a y e r s .
The initial state is denoted by s0 ∈ S. This state can be thought of as being determined
as part of the description of the game or as chosen by Nature according to a given probability
distribution. For any t ≥ 1,t h es t a t est ∈ S is determined endogenously. A nonempty set X ⊂ I
is called coalition, and we denote the set of coalitions by C (that is, C is the set of nonempty




. Here, for each state
s ∈ S, wi (s) is a (strictly) positive stage payoﬀ assigned to each individual i ∈ I. The restriction
that wi (s) > 0 is a normalization, making zero payoﬀ the worst outcome. Ws is a (possibly
empty) subset of C representing the set of winning coalitions in state s.W eu s eWs to model
political institutions in state s. This allows us to summarize diﬀerent political procedures, such
as weighted majority or supermajority rules, in an economical fashion. For example, if in state
s a majority is required for decision-making, Ws includes all subsets of I that form a majority;
if in state s individual i is a dictator, Ws includes all coalitions that include i.4 Since Ws is a
function of the state, the procedure for decision-making can vary across states.
Throughout the paper, we maintain the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Winning Coalitions) For any state s ∈ S, Ws ⊂ C satisﬁes:
(a) If X,Y ∈ C, X ⊂ Y ,a n dX ∈ Ws then Y ∈ Ws.
(b) If X,Y ∈ Ws,t h e nX ∩ Y 6= ∅.
Part (a) simply states that if some coalition X is winning in state s, then increasing the size
of the coalition will not reverse this. This is a natural assumption for almost any decision rule.
4Notice that Ws or the political rules do not specify certain institutional details, such as who makes proposals,
how voting takes place and so on. These are speciﬁed by the agenda-setting and voting protocols of our dynamic
game. We will show that these only have a limited eﬀect on equilibrium outcomes, justifying our focus on Ws as
a representation of “political rules”.
6Part (b) rules out the possibility that two disjoint coalitions are winning in the same state, thus
imposing a form of (possibly weighted) majority or supermajority rule. If Ws = ∅, then state s
is exogenously stable. None of our existence or characterization results depend on whether there
exist exogenously stable states.
The following binary relations on the set of states S will be useful for the rest of our analysis.
For x,y ∈ S,w ew r i t e
x ∼ y ⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ I : wi (x)=wi (y).( 1 )
In this case we call states x and y payoﬀ-equivalent,o rs i m p l yequivalent. More important for
our purposes is the binary relation ºz. For any z ∈ S, ºz is deﬁned by
y ºz x ⇐⇒ {i ∈ I : wi (y) ≥ wi (x)} ∈ Wz.( 2 )
Intuitively, y ºz x means that there exists a coalition of players that is winning (in z)w i t h
each of its members weakly preferring y to x. Note three important features about ºz.F i r s t ,i t
only contains information about stage payoﬀs. In particular, wi (y) ≥ wi (x) does not mean that
individual i will prefer a switch to state y rather than x. Whether or not he does so depends
on the continuation payoﬀs following such a switch. Second, the relation ºz does not presume
any type of coordination or collective decision-making among the members of the coalition in
question. It simply records the existence of such a coalition. Third, the relation ºz is conditioned
on z since whether the coalition of players weakly preferring y to x is winning depends on the
set of winning coalitions, which is state dependent. With a slight abuse of terminology, if (2)
holds, we say that y is weakly preferred to x in z. In light of the preceding comments, this
neither means that all individuals prefer y to x nor that there will be a change from state x to y
in the dynamic game–it simply designates that there exists a winning coalition of players, each
obtaining a greater stage payoﬀsi ny than in x.R e l a t i o nÂz is deﬁned similarly by
y Âz x ⇐⇒ {i ∈ I : wi (y) >w i (x)} ∈ Wz.( 3 )
If (3) holds, we say that y is strictly preferred to x in z.
Relation ∼ clearly deﬁnes equivalence classes; if x ∼ y and y ∼ z,t h e nx ∼ z. In contrast,
the binary relations ºz and Âz need not even be transitive. Nevertheless, for any x,z ∈ S,w e
have x ¨z x, and whenever Wz is nonempty, we also have x ºz x. Finally, from Assumption 1
we have that for any x,y,z ∈ S, y Âz x implies x ²z y,a n ds i m i l a r l yy ºz x implies x ¨z y.
The following assumption introduces some basic properties of payoﬀ functions and places
some joint restrictions on payoﬀ functions and winning coalitions.
Assumption 2 (Payoﬀs) Payoﬀs {wi (s)}i∈I,s∈S satisfy the following properties:
7(a) For any sequence of states s1,s 2,...,s k in S,
sj+1 Âsj sj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1= ⇒ s1 ¨sk sk.
(b) For any sequence of states s,s1,...,s k in S with sj Âs s for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
sj+1 Âs sj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1= ⇒ s1 ¨s sk.
Assumption 2 plays a major role in our analysis and ensures “acyclicity” (but is considerably
weaker than “transitivity”). Part (a) of Assumption 2 rules out cycles of the form y Âx x, z Ây y,
x Âz z–that is, a cycle of states (x,y,z) such that in each, a winning coalition of players strictly
prefer the next state. Part (b) of Assumption 2 rules out cycles of the form y Âs x, z Âs y,
x Âs z.5 Assumptions 1 and 2 are natural given our focus. Throughout the paper we suppose
that they hold. In addition, we sometimes impose the following (stronger) requirement.
Assumption 3 (Comparability) For x,y,s ∈ S such that x Âs s, y Âs s,a n dx ¿ y,e i t h e r
y Âs x or x Âs y.
Assumption 3 means that if two states x and y are weakly preferred to s (in s), then y and
z are Âs-comparable. It turns out to be suﬃcient to guarantee uniqueness of equilibria.6 This
assumption is not necessary for the majority of our results, including the general characterization.
Our main results are stated without this assumption and are then strengthened by imposing it.
In each period, each individual maximizes his discounted expected utility:
Ui (t)=( 1− β)
X∞
τ=t βτui (τ),( 4 )
where β ∈ (0,1) is a common discount factor and we can think of ui (t) as given by the payoﬀ
function wi (s) introduced in Assumption 2 (see, in particular, equation (9) in Section 4). We
consider situations in which β is greater than some threshold β0 ∈ (0,1) (this threshold is
derived as an explicit function of payoﬀs in Appendix A). We will then characterize the Markov
perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this dynamic game and investigate the existence and structure
of dynamically stable states.A sd e ﬁn e dm o r ef o r m a l l yi nD e ﬁnition 2, a state s is dynamically
stable if there exists a MPE and a ﬁnite time T such that this equilibrium involves st = s for
all t ≥ T–that is, a dynamically stable state persists in equilibrium.
5Neither part of Assumption 2 is implied by the other. Examples 5 and 6 in Appendix C illustrate the types
of cycles that can arise when either 2(a) or 2(b) fails.
6It is also “necessary” in the sense that if this assumption is dispensed with, it is easy to construct examples
with multiple equilibria. Example 7 in Appendix C illustrates this.
83 Axiomatic Characterization
Before specifying the details of agenda-setting and voting protocols, we provide a more abstract
(axiomatic) characterization of stable states. This axiomatic analysis has two purposes. First, it
illustrates that the key economic forces that arise in the context of dynamic collective decision-
making are largely independent of the details of the agenda-setting and voting protocols. Second,
the results in this section are a preparation for the characterization of the equilibrium of the
dynamic game introduced in the previous section; in particular, our main result, Theorem 2,
will make use of this axiomatic characterization.
The key economic insight enabling an axiomatic characterization is that with suﬃciently
forward-looking behavior, an individual should not wish to transit to a state that will ultimately
lead to another state that gives her lower utility. This basic insight enables a tight character-
ization of (axiomatically) stable states. Theorem 2 in the next section shows the equivalence
between the notions of axiomatically and dynamically stable states.
More formally, our axiomatic characterization determines a set of mappings Φ such that for
any φ ∈ Φ, φ : S → S assigns an axiomatically stable state s∞ ∈ S to each initial state s0 ∈ S.
We impose the following three axioms on φ.
Axiom 1 (Desirability) If x,y ∈ S are such that y = φ(x), then either y = x or y Âx x.
Axiom 2 (Stability) If x,y ∈ S are such that y = φ(x),t h e ny = φ(y).
Axiom 3 (Rationality) If x,y,z ∈ S are such that z Âx x, z = φ(z),a n dz Âx y,t h e n
y 6= φ(x).
All three axioms are natural in light of what we have discussed above. Axiom 1 requires
that the society should not (permanently) move from state x to another state y unless there
is a winning coalition that supports this transition. Axiom 2 encapsulates the stability notion
discussed above; if some state is not dynamically stable, it cannot be the (ultimate) stable state
for any initial state, because there will eventually be a transition away from this state (and thus
if mapping φ picks state y starting from state x, then it should also pick y starting from y).
Axiom 3 imposes the reasonable requirement that if there exists a stable state z preferred to
both x and y by winning coalitions in state x,t h e nφ should not pick y in x.
All three axioms refer to properties of φ, but they are closely related to underlying indi-
vidual preferences. Because collective decision-making aggregates individual preferences, they
indirectly apply to the mapping φ that summarizes these collective preferences (for example,
9one might think that φ aggregates individual preferences according to majority rule or weighted
supermajority rule, and so on).
We next deﬁne the set Φ formally and state the relationship between axiomatically stable
states and the mapping φ.
Deﬁnition 1 (Axiomatically Stable States) Let Φ ≡ {φ : S → S: φ satisﬁes Axioms 1—3}.
As t a t es ∈ S is (axiomatically) stable if φ(s)=s for some φ ∈ Φ. The set of stable states
(ﬁxed points) for mapping φ ∈ Φ is Dφ = {s ∈ S: φ(s)=s for φ ∈ Φ} and the set of all stable
states is D = {s ∈ S: φ(s)=s for some φ ∈ Φ}.
The next theorem establishes the existence of stable states and provides a recursive char-
acterization of such states. It also paves the way for Theorem 2, which shows the equivalence
between the equilibrium of the dynamic game in the previous section and the mappings φ ∈ Φ.
Theorem 1 (Axiomatic Characterization of Stable States) Suppose Assumptions 1 and
2 hold. Then:
1. The set Φ is non-empty. That is, there exists a mapping φ satisfying Axioms 1—3.




such that for any 1 ≤ j<l≤ |S|, μl ¨μj μj (this is feasible given Assumption 2(a)). Let













μk if Mk = ∅
s ∈ Mk: @z ∈ Mk with z Âμk s if Mk 6= ∅
. (6)
(If there exist more than one s ∈ Mk: @z ∈ Mk with z Âμk s,w ep i c ka n yo ft h e s e ;t h i s
corresponds to multiple φ functions).
3. The set of stable states of any two mappings φ1 and φ2 in Φ coincide. That is, Dφ1 =
Dφ2 = D.
4. If, in addition, Assumption 3 holds, then any φ ∈ Φ is “payoﬀ-unique” in the sense that
for any two mappings φ1 and φ2 in Φ, φ1 (s) ∼ φ2 (s) for all s ∈ S.





if 1 ≤ j<l≤ |S|,t h e nμl ¨μj μj.( 7 )
10The construction is by induction. Assumption 2(a) implies that for any nonempty collection of
states Q ⊂ S, there exists z ∈ Q such that for any x ∈ Q, x ¨z z. Applying this results to S,
we obtain μ1.N o w ,s u p p o s ew eh a v ed e ﬁned μj for all j ≤ k−1,w h e r ek ≤ |S|. Then, applying




, we conclude that there exists μk
satisfying (7) for each k.
The second step is to construct a candidate mapping φ : S → S. This is again by induction.
For k =1 ,l e tφ(μk)=μk. Suppose we have deﬁned μj for all j ≤ k − 1 where k ≤ |S|.D e ﬁne
the collection of states Mk as in (5). This is the subset of states where φ has already been
deﬁned, which satisfy φ(s)=s and are preferred to μk within μk.I f Mk is empty, then we
deﬁne φ(μk)=μk.I fMk is nonempty, then take φ(μk)=z ∈ Mk such that
s ¨μk z for any s ∈ Mk (8)
(such state z exists because we can apply Assumption 2(b) to Mk). Proceeding inductively for
all 2 ≤ k ≤ |S|,w eo b t a i nφ as in (6).
To complete the proof, we need to verify that mapping φ in (6) satisﬁes Axioms 1—3.T h i si s
straightforward for Axioms 1 and 2. In particular, by construction, either φ(μk)=μk (in that
case these axioms trivially hold), or φ(μk) is an element of Mk. In the latter case, φ(μk) Âμk μk
and φ(φ(μk)) = φ(μk) by (5). To check Axiom 3, suppose that for some state μk there exists
z such that z Âμk μk, z = φ(z),a n dz Âμk φ(μk).T h e n z Âμk μk, combined with condition




. But the last condition, z Âμk φ(μk), now contradicts (8).
This means that such z does not exist, and therefore Axiom 3 is satisﬁed.




with the property (7), φ(μk) is not given by (6) for some k,t h e nφ does not satisfy Axioms
1—3. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that φ(μk) is not given by (6) at k =1 .T h e n b y
the contradiction hypothesis φ(μ1) 6= μ1,s oφ(μ1)=μl for l>1.I n t h i s c a s e , φ does not
satisfy Axiom 1, because μl ¨μ1 μ1 by (7), yielding a contradiction. Next, again to obtain a
contradiction, suppose that φ(μk) is not given by (6) for the ﬁr s tt i m ea tk>1.T h e nMk in (5)
is well-deﬁned, so either Mk = ∅ or Mk 6= ∅.I fMk = ∅, the contradiction hypothesis implies
that φ(μk) 6= μk. Then, Axioms 1 and 2 imply φ(μk) Âμk μk and φ(φ(μk)) = φ(μk).S i n c e
Mk = ∅,w em u s th a v et h a tφ(μk)=μl for l>k , but in this case φ(μk) Âμk μk contradicts
(7). This contradiction implies that φ violates either Axiom 1 or 2 (or both). If Mk 6= ∅
and φ(μk)=μl for l>k , then Axiom 1 is violated. If Mk 6= ∅ and φ(μk)=μk,t h e nφ
violates Axiom 3 (to see this, take any z ∈ Mk 6= ∅ and observe that z Âμk μk and φ(z)=z).
Therefore, when Mk 6= ∅,w eh a v eφ(μk) ∈ Mk. Finally, φ(μk) will not be given by (6) if
there exists some s ∈ Mk such that s Âμk φ(μk). But in this case φ violates Axiom 3 (since
11s Âμk φ(μk), s Âμk μk,a n dφ(s)=s). This shows that any mapping φ that is not given by (6)
violates one of Axioms 1—3. and completes the proof of part 2.
(Part 3) Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that Dφ1 6= Dφ2.T h e n∃k :1≤ k ≤ |S| such
that μj ∈ Dφ1 ⇔ μj ∈ Dφ2 for all j<k , but either μk ∈ Dφ1 and μk / ∈ Dφ2 or μk / ∈ Dφ1 and
μk ∈ Dφ2. Without loss of generality, assume that μk ∈ Dφ1 and μk / ∈ Dφ2.T h e n (6) implies
that φ2 (μk)=μl for some l<k . Applying Axioms 1 and 2 to mapping φ2,w eo b t a i nμl Âμk μk
and φ2 (μl)=μl. The latter implies that μl ∈ Dφ2. Since, by hypothesis, μj ∈ Dφ1 ⇔ μj ∈ Dφ2
for all j<k ,w eh a v eμl ∈ Dφ1.T h e r e f o r e ,μl Âμk μk, μl Âμk φ1 (μk) (because φ1 (μk)=μk),
and φ1 (μl)=μl, but this violates Axiom 3 for mapping φ1 and establishes the desired result.
(Part 4) Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that φ1 and φ2
are two non-equivalent mappings that satisfy Axioms 1—3,t h a ti s ,t h e r ee x i s t ss o m es t a t es such
that φ1 (s) ¿ φ2 (s).P a r t3 of this Theorem (that Dφ1 = Dφ2) implies that φ1 (s)=s if and only
if φ2 (s)=s;s i n c eφ1 (s) ¿ φ2 (s),w em u s th a v et h a tφ1 (s) 6= s 6= φ2 (s).A x i o m1t h e ni m p l i e s
φ1 (s) Âs s, φ2 (s) Âs s, and Assumption 3 implies that either φ1 (s) Âs φ2 (s) or φ2 (s) Âs φ1 (s).
Without loss of generality suppose that the former is the case. Then for y = φ2 (s) there exists
φ1 (s) such that φ1 (s) Âs y, φ1 (s) Âs s,a n dφ2 (φ1 (s)) = φ1 (s) (the latter equality holds
because φ1 (s) is a φ1-stable state by Axiom 2, and by part 3 of this Theorem, it is also a
φ2-stable state). This implies that we can apply Axiom 3 to φ2 and derive the conclusion that
φ2 (s) 6= y. This contradiction completes the proof.
Theorem 1 shows that a mapping that satisﬁes Axioms 1—3 necessarily exists and provides
as u ﬃcient condition for its uniqueness. Even when the uniqueness condition, Assumption 3,
does not hold, we know that axiomatically stable states coincide for any two mappings φ1 and
φ2 that satisfy Axioms 1—3.
Theorem 1 also provides a simple recursive characterization of the set of mappings Φ that
satisfy Axioms 1—3. Intuitively, Assumption 2(a) ensures that there exists some state μ1 ∈ S,





so that (7) is satisﬁed and then recursively construct the set of states Mk ⊂ S,
k =2 ,..., |S|, that includes stable states that are preferred to state μk (that is, states s such
that φ(s)=s and s Âμk μk). When the set Mk is empty, then there exists no stable state that
is preferred to μk (in μk) by members of a winning coalition. In this case, we have φ(μk)=μk.
When Mk is nonempty, there exists such a stable state and thus φ(μk)=s for some such s.
In addition to its recursive (and thus easy-to-construct) nature, this characterization is useful
because it highlights the fundamental property of stable states emphasized in the Introduction:
a state μk is made stable precisely by the absence of winning coalitions in μk favoring a transition
to another stable state (i.e., by the fact that Mk = ∅). We will see that this insight plays an
12important role in the applications in Section 6.
Part 3 of Theorem 1 shows that the set of stable states D does not depend on the speciﬁc φ
chosen from Φ.F o rd i ﬀerent φ’s in Φ (when Φ is not a singleton), the stable state corresponding
t ot h es a m ei n i t i a ls t a t em a yd i ﬀer, but the ranges of these mappings are the same. These
ranges and the set of stable states D are uniquely determined by preferences and the structure
of winning coalitions.7 Finally, part 4 shows that when Assumption 3 holds, any stable states
resulting from an initial state must be equivalent. In other words, if s1 = φ1 (s0) and s2 = φ(s0),
then s1 and s2 might diﬀer in terms of the structure of winning coalitions, but they must give
t h es a m ep a y o ﬀ to all individuals.
We have motivated the analysis leading up to Theorem 1 with the argument that, when
agents are suﬃciently forward-looking, only axiomatically stable states should be observed (at
least in the “long run”, i.e., for t ≥ T for some ﬁnite T). The analysis of the dynamic game in
the next section substantiates this interpretation.
4 Noncooperative Foundations of Dynamically Stable States
We now describe the extensive-form game capturing dynamic interactions in the environment of
Section 2 and characterize the MPE of this game. The main result is the equivalence between
the MPE of this game and the axiomatic characterization in Theorem 1.
This game speciﬁes: (1) a protocol for a sequence of agenda-setters and proposals in each
state; and (2) a protocol for voting over proposals. Voting is sequential and is described below
(the exact sequence in which votes are cast will not matter). We represent the protocol for
agenda-setting using a sequence of mappings, {πs}s∈S, and refer to it simply as a protocol.L e t
Ks be a natural number for each s ∈ S. Then, πs is deﬁned as a mapping
πs : {1,...,K s} → I ∪ S
for each state s ∈ S.T h u se a c hπs speciﬁes a ﬁnite sequence of elements from I∪S,w h e r eKs is
the length of sequence for state s and determines the sequence of agenda-setters and proposals.
In particular, if πs (k) ∈ I, then it denotes an agenda-setter who will make a proposal from
the set of states S. Alternatively, if πs (k) ∈ S, then it directly corresponds to an exogenously-
speciﬁed proposal over which individuals vote. Therefore, the extensive-form game is general
7I nA p p e n d i xC ,w er e l a t et h es e tD to two concepts from cooperative game theory, von Neumann-
Morgenstern’s stable set and Chwe’s largest consistent set. Even though these concepts generally diﬀer, we
show that under Assumptions 1 and 2, both sets coincide with D. T h i si sa ni n t r i g u i n gr e s u l t ,t h o u g hi td o e s
not obviate the need for our axiomatic characterization in this section or the noncooperative analysis in the next
section, since our main focus is on the mappings φ, which determine the axiomatically or dynamically stable
states as a function of the initial state. Von Neumann-Morgenstern’s stable set and Chwe’s largest consistent set
are silent on this relationship.
13enough to include both proposals for a change to a new state initiated by agenda-setters or
exogenous proposals. We make the following assumption on {πs}s∈S:
Assumption 4 (Protocols) For every state s ∈ S, one (or both) of the following two conditions
is satisﬁed:
(a) For any state z ∈ S\{ s}, there is an element k :1≤ k ≤ Ks of sequence πs such that
πs (k)=z.
(b) For any player i ∈ I there is an element k :1≤ k ≤ Ks of sequence πs such that
πs (k)=i.
This assumption implies that either sequence πs contains all possible states (other than
the “status quo” s) as proposals or it allows all possible agenda-setters to eventually make a
proposal. It ensures that either all alternatives will be considered or all players will have a
chance to propose (unless a proposal is accepted earlier).
At t =0 ,s t a t es0 ∈ S is taken as given (as noted above, it might be determined as part
of the description of the environment or determined by Nature according to some probability
distribution). Subsequently (for t ≥ 1) ,t h et i m i n go fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s :
1. Period t begins with state st−1 inherited from the previous period.
2. For k =1 ,...,K st−1,t h ekth proposal Pk,t is determined as follows. If πst−1 (k) ∈ S,t h e n
Pk,t = πst−1 (k).I fπst−1 (k) ∈ I,t h e np l a y e rπst−1 (k) chooses Pk,t ∈ S.
3. If Pk,t 6= st−1, then there is a sequential voting between Pk,t and st−1 (we will show that
the sequence in which voting takes place has no eﬀect on the equilibrium and we do not
specify it here). Each player votes yes (for Pk,t)o rno (for st−1). Let Yk,t denote the
set of players who voted yes.I fYk,t ∈ Wst−1, then alternative Pk,t is accepted, otherwise
(that is, if Yk,t / ∈ Wst−1), it is rejected. If Pk,t = st−1, there is no voting and we adopt the
convention that in this case Pk,t is rejected.
4. If Pk,t is accepted, then we transition to state st = Pk,t, and the period ends. If Pk,t is
rejected or if there is no voting because Pk,t = st−1 and k<K st−1, then the game moves
to step 2 with k increased by 1;i fk = Kst−1, the next state is st = st−1,a n dt h ep e r i o d
ends.
5. In the end of the period, each player receives instantaneous utility ui (t).
Payoﬀs in this dynamic game are given by (4), with
ui (t)=
½
wi (st) if st = st−1
0 if st 6= st−1
(9)
14for each i ∈ I. In other words, in the period in which a transition occurs, each individual receives
zero payoﬀ. In all other periods, each individual i receives the payoﬀ wi (st) as a function of
the current state st. The period of zero payoﬀ can be interpreted as representing a “transaction
cost” associated with the change in the state and is introduced to guarantee the existence of a
pure-strategy MPE. Since the game is inﬁnitely-repeated and we will take β to be large, this
one-period “transaction cost” has little eﬀect on discounted payoﬀs. In particular, once (and if)
a dynamically stable state s is reached, individuals will receive wi (s) at each date thereafter.8
Examples 3 and 4 in Appendix C demonstrate that if the transaction cost is removed from (9),
a (pure-strategy) equilibrium may fail to exist or may induce cycles along the equilibrium path.
AM P Ei sd e ﬁned in the standard fashion as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) where
strategies are only functions of “payoﬀ-relevant states.” Here payoﬀ-relevant states are diﬀerent
from the states s ∈ S described above, since the order in which proposals have been made within
a given period are also payoﬀ relevant for the continuation game. Since the notion of MPE is
familiar, we do not provide a formal deﬁnition. For completeness, such a deﬁnition is provided
in Appendix C. In what follows, we will use the terms MPE and equilibrium interchangeably.
We next deﬁne dynamically stable states.
Deﬁnition 2 (Dynamically Stable States) State s∞ ∈ S is a dynamically stable state
if there exist an initial state s ∈ S,as e to fp r o t o c o l s{πs}s∈S,aM P Es t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle σ,a n d
T<∞ such that along the equilibrium path we have st = s∞ for all t ≥ T.
Put diﬀerently, s∞ is a dynamically stable state if it is reached by some ﬁnite time T and
is repeated thereafter. Our objective is to determine whether dynamically stable states exist
in the dynamic game described above and to characterize them as a function of the initial
state s0 ∈ S. We also establish the equivalence between dynamically and axiomatically stable
states characterized in the previous section. We ﬁrst introduce a slightly stronger version of
Assumption 2(b).
Assumption 2(b)* For any sequence of states s,s1,...,s k in S with sj Âs s for 1 ≤ j ≤ k
and sj ¿ sl for 1 ≤ j<l≤ k,
sj+1 ºs sj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1= ⇒ s1 ²s sk.
M o r e o v e r ,i ff o rx,y,s ∈ S we have x Âs s and y ¨s s,t h e ny ¨s x.
8Various diﬀerent alternative game forms also lead to the same results. We chose to present this one because
it appears to be the simplest one to describe and encompasses the most natural protocols for agenda setting and
voting. In particular, it allows votes to take place over all possible proposals (or all possible agenda-setters to
have a move), which is a desirable feature, since otherwise some transitions would be ruled out by the game form.
15In addition to cycles of the form y Âs x, z Âs y, x Âs z (which are ruled out by Assumption
2(b)), this assumption rules out cycles of the form y ºs x, z ºs y, x ºs z, unless the states x,
y,a n dz are payoﬀ-equivalent. It also imposes the technical requirement that when x Âs s and
y ¨s s,t h e ny ¨s x. Both requirements of this assumption are relatively mild.
The main result of the paper is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Characterization of Dynamically Stable States) Suppose that Assumptions
1, 2(a,b) and 4 hold. Then there exists β0 ∈ (0,1) such if for all β>β 0, we have the following
results.
1. For any φ ∈ Φ there exists a set of protocols {πs}s∈S a n dap u r e - s t r a t e g yM P Eσ of the
game such that st = φ(s0) for any t ≥ 1; that is, the game reaches φ(s0) after one period
and stays in this state thereafter. Therefore, s = φ(s0) is a dynamically stable state.
Moreover, suppose that Assumption 2(b)* holds. Then:
2. For any set of protocols {πs}s∈S there exists a pure-strategy MPE. Any such MPE σ has
the property that for any initial state s0 ∈ S, st = s∞ for all t ≥ 1. Moreover, there exists
φ ∈ Φ such that s∞ = φ(s0). Therefore, all dynamically stable states are axiomatically
stable.
3. If, in addition, Assumption 3 holds, then the MPE is essentially unique in the sense that
f o ra n ys e to fp r o t o c o l s{πs}s∈S, any pure-strategy MPE σ induces st ∼ φ(s0) for all t ≥ 1,
where φ ∈ Φ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Parts 1 and 2 of Theorem 2 state that the set of dynamically stable states and the set of
stable states D deﬁned by axiomatic characterization in Theorem 1 coincide; any mapping φ ∈ Φ
(satisfying Axioms 1—3) is the outcome of a pure-strategy MPE and any such MPE implements
the outcome of some φ ∈ Φ. This theorem therefore establishes the equivalence of axiomatic
and dynamic characterizations. An important implication is that the recursive characterization
of axiomatically stable states in (6) applies exactly to dynamically stable states.
The equivalence of the results of Theorems 1 and 2 is intuitive. Had the players been short-
sighted (impatient), they would care mostly about the payoﬀs in the next state or the next few
states that would arise along the equilibrium path (as in the concept of myopic stability intro-
duced next). However, when players are suﬃciently patient, in particular, when β>β 0,t h e y
care more about payoﬀs in the ultimate state than the payoﬀs along the transitional states. Con-
sequently, winning coalitions are not willing to move to a state that is not (axiomatically) stable
16according to Theorem 1; this leads to the equivalence between the concepts of axiomatically and
dynamically stable states.
To highlight some of the implications of our analysis so far and to emphasize the diﬀerence
between dynamically stable states and states that may arise when individuals are shortsighted,
we next introduce a number of corollaries of Theorems 1 and 2. We start with a simple deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3 (Myopic Stability) A state sm ∈ S is myopically stable if there does not exist
s ∈ S with s Âsm sm.
Myopic stability would apply if individuals made choices only considering their implications
in the next period. Clearly, a myopically stable state is (axiomatically and dynamically) stable,
but the converse is not true. This is stated in the next corollary, which emphasizes that a state
is made stable not by the absence of a powerful group preferring change, but by the absence of
an alternative stable state that is preferred by a powerful group. This corollary is an immediate
implication of Theorems 1 and 2, in particular, of equation (5). Its proof is omitted.
Corollary 1 1. State s∞ ∈ S is a (dynamically and axiomatically) stable state only if for
any s ∈ S with s Âs∞ s∞,a n da n yφ satisfying Axioms 1—3, s 6= φ(s).
2. The set of myopically stable states is a subset of D (the set of axiomatically and dynamically
stable states). In particular, a myopically stable state sm is a stable state, but a stable state
s∞ is not necessarily myopically stable.
The ﬁnal part of the corollary implies that s∞ may be stable even if it is not myopically
stable (recall Example 1). In particular, there may exist a state s such that s Âs∞ s∞; but s∞
may still be stable because s 6= φ(s) and leads to some other state s0, which is not preferred by
a winning coalition in s∞ (if we had s0 = φ(s) Âs∞ s∞,t h e ns∞ would not be a stable state).
Another direct implication of this corollary is that forward-looking behavior enlarges the set of
stable states.
For the next corollary, we ﬁrst introduce an additional deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4 (Ineﬃciency) State s ∈ S is (strictly) Pareto ineﬃcient if Ws 6= ∅ and
there exists a state s0 ∈ S such that wi (s0) >w i (s) for all i ∈ I.
State s ∈ S is (strictly) winning coalition ineﬃcient if there exists state s0 ∈ S such
that s0 Âs s.
Clearly, if a state s is Pareto ineﬃcient, it is winning coalition ineﬃcient, but not vice versa.
17Corollary 2 1. A stable state s∞ ∈ S can be winning coalition ineﬃcient and Pareto inef-
ﬁcient.
2. Whenever s∞ is not myopically stable, it is winning coalition ineﬃcient.
Proof. The ﬁrst part again follows from Example 1 in the Introduction. The second part
follows from the fact that if s∞ is not myopically stable, then there must exist s ∈ S such that
s Âs∞ s∞.
5 Ordered States
Theorems 1 and 2 provide a complete characterization of axiomatically and dynamically stable
states as a function of the initial state s0 ∈ S provided that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed.
While the former is a very natural assumption and easy to check, Assumption 2 may be somewhat
more diﬃcult to verify. In this section, we show that when the set of states S admits a (linear)
order according to which individual (stage) payoﬀs satisfy single-crossing or single-peakedness
properties (and the set of winning coalitions {Ws}s∈S satisﬁes some natural additional condi-
tions), Assumption 2 is satisﬁed. This result enables more straightforward application of our
main theorems in a wide variety of circumstances.
In a number of applications, the set of states S has a natural order, so that any two states
x and y c a nb er a n k e d( e . g . ,e i t h e rx is “greater than” or “less than” y). When such an order
exists, we can take, without loss of any generality, S to be a subset of R. Similarly, let I ⊂ R,
which is also without loss of any generality. Given these orders on the set of states and the set
of individuals, we introduce certain well-known restrictions on preferences.9 A l lo ft h ef o l l o w i n g
restrictions and deﬁnitions refer to stage payoﬀsa n da r et h u se a s yt ov e r i f y .
Deﬁnition 5 (Single-Crossing) Given I ⊂ R, S ⊂ R,a n d{wi (s)}i∈I,s∈S,t h esingle-
crossing condition (SC) holds if, for any i,j ∈ I and x,y ∈ S such that i<jand x<y ,
wi (y) >w i (x) implies wj (y) >w j (x) and wj (y) <w j (x) implies wi (y) <w i (x).
Deﬁnition 6 (Single-Peakedness) Given I ⊂ R, S ⊂ R,a n d{wi (s)}i∈I,s∈S,p r e f e r e n c e sa r e
single-peaked (SP) if for any i ∈ I there exists state x such that for any y,z ∈ S, y<z≤ x
or x ≥ z>yimplies wi (y) ≤ wi (z).
We next introduce a generalization of the notion of the “median voter” to more general
political institutions (e.g., those involving supermajority rules within the society or a club).
9See Barbera and Moreno (2008) for the connection between these notions.
18Deﬁnition 7 (Quasi-Median Voter) Given I ⊂ R, S ⊂ R,a n d{Ws}s∈S,p l a y e ri ∈ I is
a quasi-median voter (in state s) if for any X ∈ Ws such that X = {j ∈ I : a ≤ j ≤ b} for
some a,b ∈ R we have i ∈ X.
Denote the set of quasi-median voters in state s by Ms. Theorem 3 shows that it is nonempty
(provided that Assumption 1 is satisﬁed).
Deﬁnition 8 (Monotonic Median Voter Property) Given I ⊂ R and S ⊂ R,t h es e t s
of winning coalitions {Ws}s∈S has monotonic median voter property if for each x,y ∈ S
satisfying x<ythere exist i ∈ Mx, j ∈ My such that i ≤ j.
The last deﬁnition is general enough to encompass majority and supermajority voting as well
as these voting rules that apply for a subset of players (such as club members or those that are
part of a limited franchise). Finally, we also impose the following weak genericity assumption.
Assumption 5 (Weak Genericity) Preferences {wi (s)}i∈I,s∈S and the set of winning coali-
tions {Ws}s∈S are such that for any x,y,z ∈ S, x ºz y implies x Âz y or x ∼ y.
Assumption 5 is satisﬁed if no player is indiﬀerent between any two states (though it does
not rule out such indiﬀerences). The main results of this section are presented in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3 (Characterization with Ordered States) For any I ⊂ R, S ⊂ R,p r e f e r e n c e s
{wi (s)}i∈I,s∈S, and winning coalition {Ws}s∈S satisfying Assumption 1, we have that:
1. If single-crossing condition and monotonic median voter property hold, then Assumption
2(a,b) is satisﬁed and thus Theorem 1 applies.
2. If preferences are single-peaked and for any x,y ∈ S and any X ∈ Wx, Y ∈ Wy we have
X ∩ Y 6= ∅, then Assumption 2(a,b) is satisﬁed and thus Theorem 1 applies.
3. If in either part 1 or 2, Assumption 5 also holds, then Assumption 2(b)* is also satisﬁed
and thus Theorem 2 applies.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The conditions of Theorem 3 are relatively straightforward to verify and can be applied in a
wide variety of applications and examples. Notice that part 2 of Theorem 3 requires a stronger
condition than the monotonic median voter property. It can be veriﬁed that this condition
implies the monotonic median voter property, so part 1 of the theorem continues to be true
under the hypothesis of part 2. However, the converse is not true.10
10In particular, consider the following environment: there are two states, x<y ,a n dt w ov o t e r s ,i<j .
196 Applications
We now illustrate how the characterization results provided in Theorems 1 and 2 can be applied
in a variety of situations, including a number of political economy environments considered in
the literature. We show that in many of these environments we can simply appeal to Theorem
3. Nevertheless, we will also see that the conditions in Theorem 3 are more restrictive than
those stipulated in Theorems 1 and 2. Thus, when Theorem 3 does not apply, Theorems 1 and
2 may still be applied directly.
6.1 Voting in Clubs
Let us return to Example 2. The society consists of N individuals, so I = {1,...,N}.F o l l o w i n g
Roberts (1999), suppose that there are N states, of the form sk = {1,...,k} for 1 ≤ k ≤ N.
Roberts (1999) imposes the following strict increasing diﬀerences condition:
for all l>kand j>i , wj (sl) − wj (sk) >w i (sl) − wi (sk), (10)
and considers two voting rules: majority voting within a club (where in club sk one needs more
than k/2 votes for a change in club size) or median voter rule (where the agreement of individual
(k +1 )/2 if k is odd or k/2 and k/2+1if k is even are needed). These two voting rules lead to
corresponding equilibrium notions, which Roberts calls Markov Voting Equilibrium and Median
Voter Equilibrium, respectively. He establishes the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria with
both notions and shows that they both lead to the same set of stable clubs.
It is straightforward to verify that Roberts’s model and his two voting rules are special cases
of the general voting rules allowed in our framework. In particular, let us ﬁrst weaken Roberts’s
strict increasing diﬀerences property to single-crossing, in particular, let us assume that
for all l>kand j>i , wi (sl) >w i (sk)= ⇒ wj (sl) >w j (sk), and (11)
wj (sk) >w j (sl)= ⇒ wi (sk) >w i (sl).
Clearly, (10) implies (11) (but not vice versa). In addition, Roberts’s two voting rules can be
represented by the following sets of winning coalitions:
Wmaj




{X ∈ C :( k +1 )/2 ∈ X} if k is odd;
{X ∈ C : {k/2,k/2+1 } ⊂ X} if k is even.
Preferences are such that wi (x) <w i (y),b u twj (x) >w j (y). These preferences are single-peaked (so are any
preferences with two states). Suppose, in addition, that Wx = {{i},{i,j}},a n dWy = {{j},{i,j}}.I nt h a tc a s e ,
i and j are quasi-median voters in states x and y, respectively, and thus monotonic median voter property holds.













k=1 satisfy Assumption 1 as well as the monotonic median
voter property in Deﬁnition 8. Let us also assume that Assumption 5 holds. In this case, this
c a nb eg u a r a n t e e db ya s s u m i n gt h a twi (s) 6= wi (s0) for any i ∈ I and any s,s0 ∈ S (though a
weaker condition would also be suﬃcient). Then, it is clear that Theorem 3 from the previous
section applies to Roberts’s model and establishes the existence of a pure-strategy MPE and
characterizes the structure of stable clubs.
It can also be veriﬁed that Theorem 3 applies with considerably more general voting rules.
For example, we could allow a diﬀerent degree of supermajority rule in each club. The following
set of winning coalitions nests various majority and supermajority rules: for each k,l e tt h e
degree of supermajority in club sk be lk where k/2 <l k ≤ k and deﬁne the set a winning
coalitions as:
Wlk
sk = {X ∈ C : |X ∩ sk| ≥ l}
Then, a relatively straightforward application of Theorem 3 establishes the following proposition
(for completeness, the proof is provided in Appendix C).





sk,w h e r ek/2 <l k ≤ k for all k, the following results hold.
(i) The monotonic median voters property in Deﬁnition 8 is satisﬁed.
(ii) Suppose that preferences satisfy (11) and Assumption 5. Then Assumptions 2(a,b) and
2b* hold and thus the characterization of MPE and stable states in Theorems 1 and 2 applies.
(iii) Moreover, if only odd-sized clubs are allowed, then in the case of majority or median
voter rules Assumption 3 also holds and thus the dynamically stable state (club) is uniquely
determined as a function of the initial state (club).
This proposition shows that a sharp characterization of dynamics of clubs and the set of
stable clubs can be obtained easily by applying Theorem 3 to Roberts’s original model or to
various generalizations. Another generalization, not stated in Proposition 1, is to allow for a
richer set of clubs. For example, the feasible set of clubs can also be taken to be of the form of
{k − n,...,k,...,k+ n}∩I for a ﬁxed n (and diﬀerent values of k). It is also noteworthy that
the approach in Roberts’s paper is considerably more diﬃcult and restrictive (though Roberts
also establishes the existence of mixed-strategy MPE for any β). Therefore, this application
illustrates the usefulness of the general characterization results presented in this paper.
6.2 The Structure of Elite Clubs
In this subsection, we brieﬂy discuss another example of dynamic club formation, which allows
a simple explicit characterization. Suppose there are N individuals 1,2,...,N and N states
21s1,s 2,...,s N,w h e r esk = {1,2,...,k}. Preferences are such that for any n0 = n1 <j≤ n2 <n 3,
wk (sn0)=wk (sn1) <w k (sn3) <w k (sn2).( 1 2 )
These preferences imply that each player k wants to be part of the club, but conditional on being
in the club, he prefers to be in a smaller (more “elite”) one. In addition, a player is indiﬀerent
between two clubs he is not part of. Suppose that decisions are made by a simple majority rule
of the club members, so that winning coalitions are given by
Wsk = {X ∈ C : |X ∩ sk| >k / 2}.( 1 3 )
It is straightforward to verify that this environment satisﬁes Assumptions 1, 2(a,b), 2b*, and
3.11 Hence, we can use Theorems 1 and 2 to characterize the set of stable states and the unique
outcome mapping. First, notice that state s1 is stable. This club only includes player 1,w h oi s
thus the dictator, and who likes this state best, and thus by Axiom 1 we must have φ(s1)=s1.
In state s2, a consensus of players 1 and 2 is needed for a change. But s2 is the best state for
player 2,s oφ(s2)=s2.I ns t a t es3,t h es i t u a t i o ni sd i ﬀerent: state s2 is stable and is preferred
to s3 by both 1 and 2 (and is the only such state), so φ(s3)=s2. Proceeding inductively, we
can show that club sj is stable if and only if j =2 n for n ∈ Z+, and the unique mapping φ that
satisﬁes Axioms 1—3 is
φ(sk)=s2blog2 kc,( 1 4 )
where bxc denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to x ∈ R.
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 2 In the elite club example considered above with preferences given by (12) and
set of winning coalitions given by (13), the following results hold.
1. Assumptions 1, 2(a,b), 2b*, and 3 hold.
2. If, instead of (12),f o rn0 <n 1 <k≤ n2 <n 3 we have wk (sn0) <w k (sn1) <w k (sn3) <
wk (sn2), then single-crossing condition is satisﬁed (and monotonic median voter property
is always satisﬁed in this example).
3. Club sk is stable if and only if k =2 n for n ∈ Z+.
11This is formally shown in Appendix C. Alternatively, one could consider a slight variation where a player
who does not belong to either of any two clubs prefers the larger of the two. In this case, Theorem 3 can also be
applied. In particular, with this variation, the single-crossing condition is satisﬁed (if wi (sy) >w i (sx) for y>x
and j>i ,t h e ni/ ∈ x and thus, j/ ∈ x,a n dwj (sy) >w j (sx);c o n v e r s e l y ,wj (sy) <w j (sx) means j ∈ sy,t h u s
i ∈ sy,a n dt h e r e f o r ewi (sy) <w i (sx)). The monotonic median voter condition holds as well (one can choose
quasi-median voter in state sj to be b(j +1 )/2c ∈ Msj; this sequence is weakly increasing in j).
224. The unique mapping φ that satisﬁes Axioms 1—3 is given by (14).
Proof. See Appendix C.
6.3 Stable Voting Rules and Constitutions
Another interesting model that can be analyzed using Theorem 3 is Barbera and Jackson’s
(2004) model of self-stable constitutions. In addition, our analysis shows how more farsighted
decision-makers can be easily incorporated into Barbera and Jackson’s model.
Motivated by Barbera and Jackson’s model, let us introduce a somewhat more general frame-
work. The society takes the form of I = {1,...,N} and each state now directly corresponds to
a “constitution” represented by a pair (a,b),w h e r ea and b are integers between 1 and N.T h e
utility from being in state (a,b) is fully determined by a,s ot h a te a c hp l a y e ri receives utility
wi [(a,b)] = wi (a). (15)
In contrast, the set of winning coalitions needed to change the state is determined by b ∈ Z+:
W(a.b) = {X ∈ C : |X| ≥ b} (16)
(so b may be interpreted as the degree of supermajority).
In Barbera and Jackson’s model, individuals diﬀer according to the probability with which
they will support a proposal for a speciﬁc reform away from the status quo. The parameter a
determines the (super)majority necessary for implementing the reform. The parameter b,o n
the other hand, is the (super)majority necessary (before individual preferences are realized) for
changing the voting rule a. Expected utility is calculated before these preferences are realized
and deﬁnes wi [(a,b)]. Ranking individuals according to the probability with which they will
support the reform, Barbera and Jackson show that individual preferences satisfy (strict) single-
crossing and are (weakly) single-peaked.
For our analysis here, let us consider any situation in which preferences and winning coalitions
satisfy (15) and (16). It turns out to be convenient to reorder all pairs (a,b) on the real line
as follows: if (a,b) and (a0,b 0) satisfy a<a 0,t h e n(a,b) is located on the left of (a0,b 0),a n d
we write (a,b) < (a0,b 0); the ordering of states with the same a is unimportant. Suppose that
wi (a), and thus wi [(a,b)],s a t i s ﬁes the single-crossing condition in Deﬁnition 5. This enables
us to apply Theorem 3 to any problem that can be cast in these terms, including the original
Barbera and Jackson model.
Let us next follow Barbera and Jackson in distinguishing between two cases. In the case of
constitutions, any combination (a,b) is allowed, while in the case of voting rules, only the subset
23of states where a = b is considered (then a = b is the voting rule); in both cases it is natural
to assume b>N / 2. Barbera and Jackson call a voting rule or a constitution (a,b) self-stable if
there is no alternative voting rule (a0,b 0) with a0 = b0 (or, respectively, constitution (a0,b 0))s u c h
that (a0,b 0) is preferred to (a,b) by at least b players. Clearly, this stability notion is equivalent
to our notion of myopic stability. Given Corollary 1, it is not surprising that when we allow
players to be farsighted, the set of stable states may be enlarged.12
The following proposition shows summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 3 Consider the above-described environment and assume that preferences satisfy
single-crossing condition and Assumption 5 holds. Then:
1. Assumptions 1, 2(a,b) and 2b* are satisﬁed.
2. There exist mappings φv for the case of voting rules (a = b)a n dφc for the case of consti-
tutions that satisfy Axioms 1—3.
3. In the case of voting rules, the set of self-stable voting rules (in the sense of Barbera and
Jackson) coincides with the set of myopically stable states. In particular, any such state
(a,b),w h e r ea = b,s a t i s ﬁes φv [(a,b)] = (a,b). The set of self-stable voting rules is a
subset of set of dynamically stable states.
4. In the case of constitutions, the set of self-stable constitutions (in the sense of Barbera
and Jackson), the set of myopically stable states and the set of dynamically stable states
coincide.
Proof. See Appendix C.
6.4 Coalition Formation in Nondemocracies
A sm e n t i o n e da b o v e ,T h e o r e m s1a n d2c a nb ed i r ectly applied in situations where the set of
states does not admit a (linear) order. We now illustrate one such example using a modiﬁcation
of the game of dynamic coalition formation in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008).
12In particular, the set of stable states is enlarged in the case of voting rules, but remains the same in the
case of constitutions. This can be seen as follows: suppose constitution (a
0,b
0) is preferred to (a,b) by at least b
players; without loss of generality, we may assume that (a,b) is Pareto-eﬃcient (otherwise we could pick (a
00,b
00)
which Pareto dominates (a
0,b
0) a n dt h u si sp r e f e r r e dt o(a,b) by these b players). Then these b players also
prefer constitution (a
0,N) to (a,b),s i n c et h ep a y o ﬀs are the same. But constitution (a
0,N) is stable by Axiom




0),a n dt h u s
(a
0,N), are Pareto eﬃcient. Hence, if state (a,b) is not myopically stable, it is also not dynamically stable, for
t h ep l a y e r sm a ym o v et oc o n s t i t u t i o n(a
0,N), which is dynamically stable and preferred to (a,b) by at least N
players.
24Suppose that each state determines the ruling coalition in a society and thus the set of
states S coincides with the set of coalitions C. Members of the ruling coalition determine the
composition of the ruling coalition in the next period. A transition to any coalition in C is
allowed, which highlights that the set of states does not admit a complete order (one could
deﬁne a partial order over states, though this is not particular useful for the analysis here).13
Each agent i ∈ I is assigned a positive number γi, which we interpret as “political inﬂuence”





Suppose that payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb y
wi (X)=
½
γi/γX if i ∈ X
0 if i/ ∈ X
(17)
for any i ∈ I and any X ∈ C ≡ S.14 The restriction to (17) here is just for simplicity. Also,




Y ∈ C :
X




.( 1 8 )
Clearly, this corresponds to weighted α-majority voting among members of the incumbent coali-
tion X (with α =1 /2 corresponding to simple majority). In addition, suppose that the following
simple genericity assumption holds:
γX = γY only if X = Y .( 1 9 )
The following proposition can now be established.
Proposition 4 Consider the environment in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008). Then:
1. Assumptions 1, 2(a,b), 3 are satisﬁed, so that Theorem 1 applies and characterizes the
axiomatically stable states.
13In Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008), not all transitions were allowed. In particular, there we focused
on a game of “eliminations” from ruling coalitions in nondemocracies, so that once a particular individual was
eliminated, he could no longer be part of future ruling coalitions (either because he is “killed,” permanently exiled,
or is permanently excluded from politics by other means). Moreover, we assumed that payoﬀs were realized at
the end of the game. Appendix B discusses how the current framework can be generalized so that there are limits
on the feasible set of transitions.
14This is a special case of the payoﬀ structure in Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008), where we allowed for any
payoﬀ function satisfying the following three properties: (1) if i ∈ X and i/ ∈ Y ,t h e nwi (X) >w i (Y );( 2 )i fi ∈ X
and i ∈ Y ,t h e nwi (X) >w i (Y ) if and only if γi/γX >γ i/γY ;a n d( 3 )i/ ∈ X and i/ ∈ Y ,t h e nwi (X)=wi (Y ).
The form in (17) is adopted to simplify the discussion here.
252. Moreover, there exists an arbitrarily small perturbation of payoﬀs such that Assumption
2(b)* also holds. In this case, Theorem 2 also applies and characterizes the dynamically
stable states.
Proof. See Appendix C.
In Appendix B we introduce the possibility of restrictions on feasible transitions and show
how Proposition 4 can be generalized to cover the case of political eliminations considered in
Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008). We also illustrate how not allowing previously-eliminated
players to be part of the ruling coalition aﬀects the results and the structure of stable coalitions.
6.5 Coalition Formation in Democracy
We next brieﬂy discuss how similar issues arise in the context of coalition formation in democ-
racies, for example, in coalition formation in in legislative bargaining.15
Suppose that there are three parties in the parliament, 1,2,3, and any two of them would be
suﬃcient to form a government. Suppose that party 1 has more seats than party 2,w h i c h
in turn has more seats than party 3. The initial state is ∅, and all coalitions are possi-
ble states. Since any two parties are suﬃcient to form a government, we have W∅ = Ws =
{{1,2},{1,3},{2,3},{1,2,3}} for all s. First, suppose that all governments are equally strong
and a party with a greater share of seats in the parliament will be more inﬂuential in the coali-
tion government. Consequently, w3 (∅) ≤ w3 ({1,2}) <w 3 ({1,2,3}) <w 3 ({1,3}) <w 3 ({2,3});
other payoﬀsa r ed e ﬁned similarly. In this case, it can be veriﬁed that φ(∅)={2,3}: indeed,
neither party 2 nor party 3 wishes to form a coalition with party 1, because party 1’s inﬂuence
in the coalition government would be too strong. The equilibrium in this example then coincides
with the minimum winning coalition.
However, as emphasized in the Introduction (recall footnote 2), the dynamics of coalition
formation does not necessarily lead to minimum winning coalitions. To illustrate this, suppose
that governments that have a greater number of seats in the parliament are stronger, so that
w2 (∅) ≤ w2 ({1,3}) <w 2 ({1,2,3}) <w 2 ({2,3}) <w 2 ({1,2}). That is, party 2 receives a
higher payoﬀ even though it is a junior partner in the coalition {1,2}, because this coalition
is suﬃciently powerful. We might then expect that {1,2} may indeed arise as the equilibrium
coalition, that is, φ(∅)={1,2}. Nevertheless, whether this will be the case depends on the
continuation game after coalition {1,2} is formed. Suppose, for example, that after the coalition
15See, for example, Baron and Ferejohn (1986), Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Baron (1991), Jackson and
Moselle (2002), and Norman (2002) for models of legislative bargaining. The recent paper by Diermeier and Fong
(2008) that studies legislative bargaining as a dynamic game without commitment also raises a range of issues
related to our general framework here.
26{1,2} forms, party 1, by virtue of its greater number of seats, can sideline party 2 and rule
by itself. Let us introduced the shorthand symbol “7→” to denote such a feasible transition,
so that we have {1,2} 7→ {1} (which naturally presumes that W{1,2} = {X ∈ C :1∈ X}).
Similarly, starting from the coalition {2,3},p a r t y2 c a na l s od ot h es a m e ,s ot h a tW{2,3} =
{X ∈ C :2∈ X} and {2,3} 7→ {2}. However, it is also reasonable to suppose that once party 2
starts ruling by itself, then party 1 can regain power by virtue of its greater seat share, that is,
W{2} = {C ∈ C :1∈ C} and thus {2} 7→ {1}. In this case, the analysis in this paper immediately
shows that φ(∅)={2,3}, that is, the coalition {2,3} emerges as the dynamically stable state.
What makes {2,3} dynamically stable in this case is the fact that {2} is not dynamically
stable itself. This example therefore reiterates, in the context of coalition formation in democ-
racies, the insight (discussed after Theorem 1 and in Corollary 1) that the instability of states
that can be reached from a state s contributes to the stability of state s.
6.6 Ineﬃcient Inertia and Lack of Reform
We now provide a more detailed example capturing the main trade-oﬀse m p h a s i z e di nE x a m p l e1
in the Introduction. Consider a society consisting of N individuals and a set of ﬁnite states S.W e
start with s0 = a corresponding to absolutist monarchy, where individual E holds power. More
formally, Wa = {X ∈ C : E ∈ X}. Suppose that for all x ∈ S\{ a},w eh a v et h a tI\{ E} ∈ Wx,
that is, all players except E together form a winning coalition. Moreover, there exists a state,
“democracy,” d ∈ S such that φ(x)=d for all x ∈ S\{ a}. In other words, starting with any
regime other that absolutist monarchy, we will eventually end up with democracy. Suppose also
that there exists y ∈ S such that wi (y) >w i (a), meaning that all individuals are better oﬀ in
state y than in absolutist monarchy, a. In fact, the gap between the payoﬀsi ns t a t ey and those
in a could be arbitrarily large. It is then straightforward to verify that Assumptions 1—3 are
satisﬁed in this game.
To understand economic interactions in the most straightforward manner, consider the
extensive-form game described in Section 4. It is then clear that for β suﬃciently large, E
will not accept any reforms away from a, since these will lead to state d and thus φ(a)=a.
This example illustrates the potential (and potentially large) ineﬃciencies that can arise in
games of dynamic collective decision-making and emphasizes that commitment problems are at
the heart of these ineﬃciencies. If the society could collectively commit to stay in some state
y 6= d, then these ineﬃciencies could be partially avoided. And yet such a commitment is not
possible, since once state y is reached, E can no longer block the transition to d.
276.7 Middle Class and Democratization
Let us next consider a variation of the environment discussed in the previous subsection. Suppose
again that the initial state is s0 = a,w h e r eWa = {X ∈ C : E ∈ X}. To start with, suppose that
there is only one other agent, P, representing the poor, and two other states, d1, democracy
with limited redistribution, and d2, democracy with extensive redistribution. Suppose that
Wd1 = Wd2 = {X ∈ C : P ∈ X}. Suppose
wE (d2) <w E (a) <w E (d1) and wP (a) <w P (d1) <w P (d2),
so that P prefers “extensive” redistribution. Given the fact that Wd1 = Wd2 = {P},o n c e
democracy is established, the poor can implement extensive redistribution. Anticipating this,
E will resist democratization.
Now consider an additional social group, M, representing the middle class, and suppose that
the middle class is suﬃciently numerous so that
Wd1 = Wd2 = {{M,P},{E,M,P}}.
The middle class is also opposed to extensive redistribution, so
wM (a) <w M (d2) <w M (d1).
This implies that once state d1 emerges, there no longer exists a winning coalition to force
extensive redistribution. Now anticipating this, E will be happy to establish democracy (extend
the franchise). Thus, this example illustrates how the presence of an additional powerful player,
such as the middle class, can have a moderating eﬀect on political conﬂict and enable institutional
reform that might otherwise be impossible (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a, for examples in
which the middle class may have played such a role in the process of democratization).
6.8 Concessions in Civil War
Let us brieﬂy consider an application of the ideas in this paper to the analysis of civil wars. This
example can also be used to illustrate how similar issues arise in the context of international
wars (see, e.g., Fearon, 1996, 2004, Powell, 1998). Suppose that a government, G,i se n g a g e d
in a civil war with a rebel group, R. The civil war state is denoted by c. The government can
initiate peace and transition to state p,s ot h a tWc = {C ∈ C : G ∈ C}. However, using the
shorthand “7→” introduced in subsection 6.5, we now have p 7→ r,w h e r er denotes a state in
which the rebel group becomes strong and suﬃciently inﬂuential in domestic politics. Moreover,
Wp = {X ∈ C : R ∈ X}, and naturally, wR (r) >w R (p).I f wG (r) <w G (c), there will be no
28peace and φ(c)=c despite the fact that we may also have wG (p) >w G (c). The reasoning for
why civil war may continue in this case is similar to that for ineﬃcient inertia discussed above.
As an interesting modiﬁcation, suppose next that the rebel group R can ﬁrst disarm partially,
in particular, c 7→ d,w h e r ed denotes the state of partial disarmament. Moreover, d 7→ dp,
where the state dp involves peace with the rebels that have partially disarmed. Suppose that
Wdp = {{G,R}}, meaning that once they have partially disarmed, the rebels can no longer
become dominant in domestic politics. In this case, provided that wG (dp) >w G (d),w eh a v e
φ(c)=dp. Therefore, the ability of the rebel group to make a concession changes the set of
dynamically stable states. This example therefore shows how the role of concessions can also be
introduced into this framework in a natural way.
6.9 Taxation and Public Good Provision
In many applications preferences are deﬁned over economic allocations, which are themselves
determined endogenously as a function of political rules. Our main results can also be applied
in such environments. Here we illustrate this by providing an example of taxation and public
good provision.
Suppose there are N individuals 1,2,...,N and N states s1,s 2,...,s N,w h e r esk =
{1,2,...,k}. We assume that decisions on transitions are made by an absolute majority rule of
individuals who are enfranchised, so that winning coalitions take the form
Wsk = {X ∈ C : |X ∩ sk| >k / 2}.








where Ai is individual i’s productivity (we assume Ai >A j for i<j ,s ot h a tl o w e r - r a n k e d
individuals are more productive), E denotes the expectations operator, and τsj is the tax rate
determined when the voting franchises sj. When an odd number of individuals are allowed to
vote, the tax rate is determined by the median. When there is an even number of voters, each
of two median voters gets to set the tax rate with equal probability. The expectations in (20)





is the public good provided through taxation, where h is an increasing
concave function.
For the single-crossing property, we require that for any i<j∈ I and for any sl,s l+1 ∈ S,
wj (sl+1) >w j (sl) ⇒ wi (sl+1) >w i (sl) and wi (sl+1) <w i (sl) ⇒ wj (sl+1) <w j (sl).
29Denoting the equilibrium taxes in states sl and sl+1 by τsl+1 and τsl, the following condition is









Ai − E(1 − τsl)Ai,
since the equilibrium levels of public goods, Gsl and Gsl+1, cancel out from both sides. Therefore,
Eτsl+1 > Eτsl (21)
is suﬃcient for single-crossing. Notes that individual i, when determining the tax rate in sl,
would maximize















From the concavity of h it follows that for i<j , τi >τ j. Now consider a switch from sl to
sl+1. Then, with probability 1/2, the tax is set by the same individual (then the tax rate is
the same in sl+1 as in sl), and with probability 1/2, by a less productive individual (then the
tax rate is greater in sl+1 than in sl). Therefore, (21) holds and we can apply Theorem 3 to
characterize the dynamically stable states in this society. More interestingly, these results can
also be extended to situations where public goods [taxes] are made available diﬀerentially to
[imposed on] those who have voting rights (club members).
7C o n c l u s i o n
A central feature of collective decision-making in many social situations, such as societies choos-
ing their constitutions or political institutions, or political coalitions, international unions, or
private clubs choosing their membership, is that the rules that govern the regulations and proce-
dures procedures for future decision-making, and inclusion and exclusion of members are made
by the current members and under the current regulations. This feature implies that dynamic
collective decisions must recognize the implications of current decisions on future choices. For
example, current constitutional change must recognize how the new constitution will open the
way for further changes in laws and regulations and how these further changes might aﬀect the
long-run payoﬀso fd i ﬀerent players.
We developed a general framework for a systematic study of this class of problems. We
provided both an axiomatic and a noncooperative characterization of stable states and showed
30that the set of (dynamically) stable states can be computed recursively. This recursive char-
acterization highlights that a particular state s is stable if there does not exist another stable
state that makes a winning coalition (in s) better oﬀ. An implication of this reasoning is that
stable states need not be Pareto eﬃcient; there may exist a state that provides higher payoﬀs
to all individuals, but is itself not stable.
We also showed that our framework is general enough to nest various diﬀerent models that
have been used in the literature to analyze speciﬁc problems in which current collective decisions
aﬀect future decision-making procedures. These include models of ineﬃcient inertia (lack of
reform) because of fear of changes in the future balance of political power, models of institutional
change and enfranchisement (such as Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, 2006a, Lizzeri and Persico,
2004, and Jack and Lagunoﬀ, 2006), models of voting in clubs (such as Roberts, 1999, and
Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev, 2001), models of the stability of constitutions (such as Barbera
in Jackson, 2004), and models of coalition formation in democracies and nondemocracies. In
these cases and in a number of others, we illustrated how models previously studied in the
literature are special cases of our framework and how our approach highlights the main economic
insights in these diverse environments
Although our framework is fairly general, our analysis still relies on a number of important
assumptions. Some of those are necessary for our general approach (for example, a minimum
amount of acyclicity is essential). Others are adopted for convenience and can be relaxed, though
often at the cost of further complication. Among possible extensions, we believe that most
interesting would be to introduce stochastic elements, so that the set of feasible transitions or
the distribution of powers stochastically vary over time, and to include capital-like state variables
so that some subcomponents of the state have autonomous dynamics. Such extensions would
allow us to incorporate an even larger set of dynamic political games within this framework. We
view the analysis of such dynamics as an interesting area for future research.
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7.1 Proof of Theorem 2
We start with a lemma about the structure of MPE and SPE in voting games. This lemma plays
an important role in the proof of Theorem 2 and is of independent interest in the context of
dynamic political economy models. It establishes that there always exists a pure-strategy MPE
(and SPE) in which each individual votes for the outcome that he or she strictly prefers and
that in any (mixed- or pure-strategy) equilibrium the outcome that is preferred by suﬃciently
many players (a “winning coalition”) will be implemented.
Lemma 1 Consider the following I-player extensive-form game GN with perfect information
and N stages. In each stage k, one player ik (this player may be the same for diﬀerent k’s) takes
action ak ∈ {y,n}.T h e p a y o ﬀ vector is given by the mapping v : {y,n}
N → {¯ y,¯ n},w h e r e¯ y,
¯ n ∈ RI are the two possible vectors of payoﬀs. Suppose that if for some k, v(ak = n,a−k)=¯ y,
then we also have v(ak = y,a−k)=¯ y (i.e., if for any proﬁle of actions other than that at stage
k, a−k,t h ev o t eak = n leads to ¯ y,t h e ns od o e sak = y; this ensures that action y does not make
outcome ¯ y less likely). Then the following results hold.
(i) There exists a pure-strategy MPE (and SPE) in GN where ak = y if vik (¯ y) >v ik (¯ n) and
ak = n if vik (¯ y) <v ik (¯ n) (where vi (¯ y) and vi (¯ n) denote the payoﬀso fp l a y e ri under the payoﬀ
vectors ¯ y and ¯ n, respectively).
(ii) Suppose that the set of players Y = {i : vi (¯ y) >v i (¯ n)} is large enough, in the sense that
v(a1,...,a N)=¯ y whenever ak = y for all ik ∈ Y.T h e n i n a n y S P E o f GN, the equilibrium
payoﬀ vector will be ¯ y with probability 1. Similarly, if the set of players N = {i : vi (¯ y) <v i (¯ n)}
is large enough, so that v(a1,...,a N)=¯ n whenever ak = n for all ik ∈ N,t h e ni na n yS P Eo f
GN, the equilibrium payoﬀ vector will be ¯ n with probability 1.
(iii) Suppose that the ﬁrst N stages of a ﬁnite or inﬁnite extensive-form game GN0 with
perfect information satisfy the requirements above, except that instead of payments at terminal
nodes taking two values only, we have that there are two classes of isomorphic subgames, S¯ y and
S¯ n,w i t hp a y o ﬀ vectors ¯ y and ¯ n respectively. Take any MPE σ and let Y = {i : vi (S¯ y) >v i (S¯ n)}
and N = {i : vi (S¯ y) <v i (S¯ n)},w h e r evi (S¯ y) and vi (S¯ n) are continuation payoﬀso fp l a y e ri.
If v(a1,...,a N)=¯ y whenever ak = y for all ik ∈ Y, then the equilibrium continuation game
reached after N stages is S¯ y and the expected utility players receive in this MPE is v(S¯ y).C o n -
versely, if v(a1,...,a N)=¯ n whenever ak = n for all ik ∈ N, then the equilibrium continuation
game reached after N stages is S¯ n and the expected utility players receive in this MPE is v(S¯ n).
32P r o o fo fL e m m a1( P a r t1 )We need to show that for the proﬁle of strategies in which
ak = y if vik (¯ y) >v ik (¯ n) and ak = n if vik (¯ y) <v ik (¯ n) (and ak is either y or n if vik (¯ y)=
vik (¯ n)), there is no proﬁtable deviation for any player at any stage (this will establish the
existence of a pure-strategy MPE and SPE). Consider player ik such that vik (¯ y) >v ik (¯ n) and
s u p p o s et h a th ep l a y sak = y.I f h e s w i t c h e s t o a0
k = n, this would not change the action of
any of the subsequent voters, and therefore this either would not change the outcome of the
voting (i.e., the payoﬀ v e c t o r )o rw i l lc h a n g ei tf r o m¯ y to ¯ n. In both cases this deviation is not
proﬁtable. Similarly, for player ik with vik (¯ y) <v ik (¯ n), deviation from ak = n to a0
k = y can
change the payoﬀ vector from ¯ n to ¯ y only, which is not proﬁtable for such player. Finally, if for
player ik, vik (¯ y)=vik (¯ n), then any outcome yields the same payoﬀ a n dt h u st h i sp l a y e rd o e s
not have a proﬁtable deviation, which completes the proof of part 1.
(Part 2) We prove this by induction on the number of stages k.
Base: take k =1 . Suppose that set Y is large enough, so that player i1 choosing action
a1 = y is suﬃcient for the payoﬀ vector to be ¯ y. To obtain a contradiction, suppose that in a
SPE the equilibrium payoﬀ vector may be diﬀerent from ¯ y with a positive probability, in which
case the payoﬀ vector is ¯ n. But then player i1 is better oﬀ if he chooses action a1 = y with
probability 1, since he would then receive vi1 (¯ y), which cannot be the case in an equilibrium.
We can similarly consider the case where set N is large enough. We have thus proved the base.
Step from k − 1 to k: suppose that we have proved the result for all l ≤ k − 1; consider the
game with k stages. Suppose that set Y is large enough. Consider two cases.
Case 1: suppose that vi1 (¯ y) >v i1 (¯ n). In this case, if player i1 in stage 1 takes action
a1 = y, then in the subgame starting at stage 2 the following is true: if all players for whom
vij (¯ y) >v ij (¯ n) for all 2 ≤ j ≤ k choose aj = y, then the payoﬀ vector will be ¯ y. By induction,
any SPE in this subgame will lead to ¯ y with probability 1. Now if for some SPE of the entire
game the payoﬀ vector were ¯ n with positive probability, then player i1 could ensure that the
payoﬀ vector is ¯ y with probability 1 by choosing a1 = y and would thus have a proﬁtable
deviation. Therefore, in this case, the payoﬀ vector must be ¯ y with probability 1.
Case 2: suppose that vi1 (¯ y) ≤ vi1 (¯ n). Then, by assumption, if in the subgame starting at
stage 2 all players for whom vij (¯ y) >v ij (¯ n) for all 2 ≤ j ≤ k choose aj = y, then the payoﬀ
vector will be ¯ y. By induction, for any SPE in any subgame starting at stage 1, the payoﬀ vector
is ¯ y with probability 1. But this implies that the same holds for the entire k-stage game.
The two cases together complete the induction step for the case where Y is large enough.
The case where N is large enough is analogous. This argument completes the proof of part 2.
(Part 3) This immediately follows from part 2, since a MPE induces a SPE in the truncated
game of ﬁrst k stages with payoﬀs given by continuation payoﬀs of the original game. ¥
337.2 Proof of Theorem 2
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2( P a r t1 )First, suppose that β satisﬁes the following conditions:











wi (s) − wi (s0)
maxz∈S wi (z)
.
There is a ﬁnite number (not more than |I| × |S| × (|S| − 1)) of conditions in (A1). It is
straightforward to verify that there exists β0 ∈ (0,1) such that for all β>β 0,( A 1 )h o l d s .
We construct a MPE of the game with the following property: for each period t ≥ 1,
st = φ(st−1). We introduce the following notation: for i ∈ I and s,q ∈ S,l e t
Vi (s,q)=
½
(1 − β)wi (s) if s = q




βwi (φ(q)) if φ(q)=q
β2wi (φ(q)) if φ(q) 6= q
¾
.( A 2 )
(This means that Vi (s,q) is given by one of the four expressions in (A2) depending on whether
s = q and φ(q)=q). In the equilibrium we construct below, Vi (s,q) will be the continuation
payoﬀ of player i as a function of the current state s and accepted proposal is q.G i v e nt h ef o c u s
on MPE, we drop the time indices.
For each s ∈ S,t a k eKs ≥ |S| − 1.T a k e πs (·) such that πs (Ks)=φ(s) if φ(s) 6= s;
otherwise, take πs (k) arbitrarily (making sure that Assumption 4 is satisﬁed). Consider the
strategy proﬁle σ∗ constructed as follows:
Each player player i ∈ I votes for proposal Pk (says yes) if and only if:
(i) either k = Ks (we are at the last stage of voting), PKs = φ(s) and Vi (s,φ(s)) >V i (s,s);
(ii) or Vi (s,Pk) >V i (s,φ(s)).
In addition, if πs (k) ∈ I for some k, this player chooses proposal Pk arbitrarily.
The strategy proﬁle σ∗ is Markovian. We will show that it is an MPE in three steps.
First, we will show that under the strategy proﬁle σ∗, there is a transition to φ(s) if φ(s) 6= s
and no transition if φ(s)=s.I f φ(s) 6= s, then Axiom 1 implies that the set of players for
whom Vi (s,φ(s)) >V i (s,s) is a winning coalition in s,t h a ti s ,
Xs ≡ {i : wi (φ(s)) >w i (s)} ∈ Ws.
To see this, observe that (A1) and the fact that β>β 0 imply that βwi (φ(s)) >w i (s) for all
i ∈ Xs. Therefore, for all i ∈ Xs,w eh a v e
Vi (s,φ(s)) = βwi (φ(s)) > (1 − β)wi (s)+β2wi (φ(s)) = Vi (s,s).
Next, we can similarly show that there exists no X0
s ∈ Ws such that Vi (s,Pk) >V i (s,φ(s)) for
all i ∈ X0
s, that is, the set of players for whom Vi (s,Pk) >V i (s,φ(s)) does not form a winning
34coalition in s. To obtain a contradiction, suppose there exists such a X0
s.T h e n s i n c e Pk 6= s
and φ(φ(s)) = φ(s), we would have that
βwi (φ(Pk)) ≥ Vi (s,Pk) >V i (s,φ(s)) ≥ βwi (φ(s)) for all i ∈ X0
s,
and thus
wi (φ(Pk)) >w i (φ(s)) for all i ∈ X0
s.
Then the fact that X0
s ∈ Ws implies φ(Pk) Âs φ(s),w h i c h ,g i v e nt h a tφ(s) Âs s, yields
φ(Pk) Âs s by Assumption 2(b)*. But φ(Pk) Âs φ(s), φ(Pk) Âs s,a n dφ(Pk)=Pk contradicts
Axiom 3 and yields a contradiction to our hypothesis that X0
s ∈ Ws. Therefore, the set of
players with Vi (s,Pk) >V i (s,φ(s)) does not form a winning coalition in s. We have therefore
established that under σ∗, PKs = φ(s) if φ(s) 6= s is accepted and all other proposals are
rejected.
Second, we verify that given σ∗,c o n t i n u a t i o np a y o ﬀs after acceptance of proposal q are given
by (A2).I f p r o p o s a l q 6= s is accepted, then there is an immediate transition, and there is
a n o t h e rt r a n s i t i o nn e x tp e r i o di nc a s eφ(q) 6= q. If no proposal is accepted, so that q = s,t h e n
there is no transition in the current period, and each player i receives stage utility (1 − β)wi (s);
in addition, if φ(s)=φ(q) 6= q = s, then there is a transition next period. In either case, the
continuation payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb y(A2).
Third, we show that there are no proﬁtable deviations from σ∗ at any stage. For an agenda-
setter this holds because no proposal that an agenda-setter makes is accepted. For a voter
this follows from Lemma 1(a): the continuation strategies are Markovian, and therefore each
voting stage constitutes a ﬁnite game with two possible outcomes. Lemma 1(a) then establishes
that it is always a best response for a voter to vote for the option that he (weakly) prefers. If
φ(s) 6= s, then in the last voting stage, each player i compares continuation payoﬀ Vi (s,φ(s))
if the proposal is accepted and Vi (s,s) if it is rejected. In all other voting stages, player i
receives Vi (s,Pk) if proposal Pk is accepted and Vi (s,φ(s)) if it is rejected (because φ(s) will be
eventually accepted if φ(s) 6= s and no proposal will be accepted, in which case each player will
receive Vi (s,φ(s)) = Vi (s,s) if φ(s)=s). Therefore, there are no proﬁtable deviations from σ∗
given the continuation payoﬀsi n(7). This argument establishes that the strategy proﬁle σ∗ is
a best response to itself for any s ∈ S in the truncated game given the continuation payoﬀsi n
(7). Since we have already established that under σ∗, the continuation payoﬀs starting in state
s are given by Vi (s,q) in (A2), σ∗ is a MPE of the entire game, which completes the proof of
the ﬁrst part of the Theorem.
(Part 2) We ﬁrst prove that a MPE exists. We then show that it has the properties stated
in part 2 of the Theorem.
35Let us ﬁrst construct a speciﬁc mapping φ satisfying Axioms 1—3. Take a sequence of states n
μ1,...,μ |S|
o
satisfying (7). Then, follow the procedure described in Theorem 1. First, we set




z ∈ Mk : ∀s ∈ Mk : s ²μk z
ª
.
The set Zk is nonempty by Assumption 2(b)*, and according to the procedure, any element of
Zk m a yb ec h o s e na sφ(μk). Proceeding inductively, a speciﬁc mapping φ is obtained.
We construct an equilibrium in which continuation payoﬀ of player i i ft h ec u r r e n ts t a t ei ss
and proposal q is accepted, Vi (s,q),i sg i v e nb y(A2) (in particular, if no alternative is accepted
at a given period, each player i receives Vi (s,s)). Given these continuation payoﬀs, each period
c a nb ev i e w e da saﬁnite (truncated) game with terminal payoﬀsg i v e nb yVi (s,q). By backward
induction, we can construct a SPE σ0 of this truncated game as follows: let k∗ be such that
πs (k∗)=φ(s) if such k∗ exists; otherwise, let k∗ be the ﬁrst stage where πs (k∗)=i ∈ I
where wi (φ(s)) >w i (s) (such i exists, because φ satisﬁes Axiom 1). We require that φ(s) is
proposed and accepted at stage k∗, and that no proposal is accepted at any stage l<k ∗.G i v e n
the continuation payoﬀsi n(A2), it is straightforward to verify that there are no proﬁtable
deviations from σ0 and thus σ0 is indeed a SPE. Since actions in σ0 only depend on proposals
and on the stage of this ﬁnite truncated game, we can choose σ0 to be Markovian (the only
r e q u i r e m e n ti st oc h o o s ea nS P Eσ0, where each player votes no when indiﬀerent; clearly, such
an SPE exists). Therefore, we have established the existence of an MPE.
We now establish the properties that any MPE satisﬁe s .T a k ea n ys e to fs e q u e n c e s{πs (·)}s∈S
and any pure-strategy MPE σ. For any state s, the proposal q that is accepted along the
equilibrium path is well-deﬁned (let q = s i fa l lp r o p o s a l sa r er e j e c t e d )a n dl e tu sd e n o t ei tb y
χ(s)=q.F i r s t , n o t e t h a t χ : S → S has “no cycles,” in the sense that if χ(s) 6= s then for
any n>1, χn (s) 6= s (where χ2 (s) ≡ χ(χ(s)) etc.). This can be established by contradiction.
Suppose there exists n such that χn (s)=s, but χ(s) 6= s.D e n o t e b y Js ⊂ {1,...,K s} the
set of voting stages in state s where a proposal Pk made along the equilibrium path is accepted
(this proposal and whether it is accepted do not depend on the play before current stage k,s i n c e
strategies are Markovian). By the deﬁnition of the mapping χ,t h eﬁrst voting stage in Js leads
to χ(s).N o wi ts u ﬃces to consider two cases.
Case (i): all voting stages in Js lead to cycles. Suppose this is the case and consider the
last voting stage k0. Here each player knows that he will receive zero utility if Pk0 is accepted,
and that he will receive (1 − β)ws (i) > 0 if Pk0 is accepted. Then Lemma 1(c) implies that Pk0
cannot be accepted in any MPE, thus yielding the desired contradiction.
36Case (ii): not all voting stages in Js lead to cycles. In this case, denote the voting stages
that do not lead to cycles by J0
s ⊂ Js. Consider the last voting stage k in Js that precedes the
ﬁrst voting stage in J0
s. Accepting the proposal made at k0, Pk0, leads to zero utility to each
player, while rejecting it leads to a positive payoﬀ. Therefore, proposal Pk0 cannot be accepted
in any MPE, again yielding a contradiction and establishing the “no cycle” result.
This “no cycle” result in turn implies that χn (s)=χ|S| − 1(s) for all n ≥ |S| − 1. Then,
deﬁne ψ(s)=χ|S|−1 (s),a n d
m(s)=m i n{n ∈ N∪{0} : χn (s)=ψ(s)},( A 3 )
(with χ0 (s)=s). Evidently, 0 ≤ m(s) ≤ |S|−1,a n dm(s)=0if and only if ψ(s)=χ(s)=s.
Moreover,
ψ (ψ (s)) = χ(ψ(s)) = ψ(χ(s)) = ψ(s) (A4)
for any state s, as follows from the deﬁnition of mapping ψ). Finally, let us also deﬁne
¯ Vi (s,q)=
½
(1 − β)wi (s) if s = q
0 if s 6= q
¾
+ βm(q)+1wi (ψ(q)).( A 5 )
Clearly, ¯ Vi (s,a) gives the continuation payoﬀ of player i if in state s alternative q is implemented,
and subsequently equilibrium play (according to the MPE σ)f o l l o w s . T h er e s to ft h ep r o o f
involves showing that (1) ψ(s) satisﬁes Axioms 1—3,a n dt h e n( 2 )χ(s)=ψ(s) (this second
statement is equivalent to showing that χ(s) is the dynamically stable state reached with zero
or one transition, so that in the MPE σ, st = χ(s0) for all t ≥ 1) .W es t a r tw i t ha ni n t e r m e d i a t e
result. Then we prove that ψ (s) satisﬁes Axioms 1—2.T h e nw ep r o v et h a tχ(s)=ψ(s). Finally,
we prove that ψ satisﬁes Axiom 3. (This order makes the proof simpler).





ψ(Pkl). To establish this, for each state s consider again the set of voting stages J such that




,w h e r ekj <k l for j<l(we
drop index s for convenience), and suppose that J 6= ∅ (this implies χ(s) 6= s and m(s) ≥ 1).
In equilibrium, proposal Pk1 is accepted, so ψ (Pk1)=ψ(s) and m(Pk1)=m(s) − 1 (which
implies that ψ (s) 6= s). Since each Pkl for 1 ≤ l ≤ |J| is accepted in this equilibrium, we must





for 1 ≤ l ≤ |J| − 1




could vote for acceptance,










in view of the
fact that β>β 0).






















, while if it is rejected, each player will receive ¯ Vi (s,s)=






















< ¯ Vi (s,s).S i n c ePk|J|






<w i (ψ(Pk1)) must be suﬃciently small,
and, more precisely, we must have
n






















for all 1 ≤ l ≤ |J| − 1. Indeed, if this were not the case, each player would receive a strictly
higher payoﬀ if Pkl was rejected at stage kl,s oPkl could not be accepted in the equilibrium.
Proof that ψ satisﬁes Axiom 1. Consider the set J introduced above and consider stage k|J|,

















If Pk|J| is rejected, each player receives
¯ Vi (s,s)=( 1− β)wi (s)+βm(s)+1wi (ψ (s)).






= wi (ψ(s)) and that m(s)=m(Pk1)+1≤





¯ Vi (s,s) for a winning coalition of players in s,t h a ti s ,
Xs =
n




≥ ¯ Vi (s,s)
o
∈ Ws.
Then for all i ∈ Xs,w em u s th a v e





+1wi (ψ(s)) ≥ (1 − β)wi (s)+βm(s)+1wi (ψ(s)).
This implies that
βm(s)wi (ψ(s)) ≥ wi (s) for all i ∈ Xs,
38which, in view of the fact that β>β 0,i m p l i e st h a twi (ψ(s)) ≥ wi (s) for all i ∈ Xs.H o w e v e r ,
if for some i ∈ Xs, wi (ψ(s)) = wi (s), then we would have βm(s)wi (ψ(s)) <w i (s), because
m(s) ≥ 1 and ψ(s) 6= s. Consequently, wi (ψ(s)) >w i (s) for all i ∈ Xs, which implies that
{i ∈ I : wi (ψ (s)) >w i (s)} ∈ Ws,
thus establishing that
ψ(s) Âs s for any s ∈ S with ψ(s) 6= s,
and therefore Axiom 1 holds.
Proof that ψ satisﬁes Axiom 2. This is straightforward in view of the fact that ψ(ψ(s)) =
ψ(s).
Proof that χ(s)=ψ (s). Let us prove that if ψ(s) 6= s, then transition to state ψ(s) takes
place in one step, i.e., that ψ(s)=χ(s) (or, equivalently, in (A3) m(s)=1whenever χ(s) 6= s).
Consider two cases.





is proven to hold. But we proved that m(Pkl) is weakly increasing in l,t h e r e f o r e ,m(χ(s)) =
m(Pk1)=0 , and therefore m(s)=1 .
Case (ii): ψ(s)=Pkj does not hold for any j.T h i si m p l i e st h a tm(Pk1) ≥ 1 and ψ(s) 6=
χ(s). First observe that in this case, if for some k/ ∈ J we have Pk = ψ(s) (regardless of whether
this happens on or oﬀ equilibrium path), then Pk should be accepted. This can be established
with the following argument: take any player i.I fPk = ψ(s) is accepted, this player will receive
¯ Vi (s,ψ (s)) = βwi (ψ (s)), while if it is rejected, he will receive
¯ Vi (s,Pkl)=βm(Pkl)+1wi (ψ (s)) ≤ β2wi (ψ (s))
for some l if k<k |J| and
¯ Vi (s,s)=( 1− β)wi (s)+βm(Pk1)+1wi (ψ(s)) ≤ (1 − β)wi (s)+β2wi (ψ(s))
if k>k |J|.I n t h e ﬁrst case, all players prefer to have Pk accepted, while in the second case,
each player with wi (ψ(s)) >w i (s) will have βwi (ψ(s)) >w i (s) since β>β 0, and therefore
¯ Vi (s,ψ (s)) > ¯ Vi (s,s). Since such players form a winning coalition, we conclude that Pk = ψ(s)
will necessarily be accepted. Since we know that this k/ ∈ J, it must be the case that proposal
ψ(s) is never considered on equilibrium path. By Assumption 4, it must be that each player
become agenda-setter for some k. But then take any player i such that wi (ψ(s)) >w i (s) and
suppose that he is agenda-setter at stage k. This player’s equilibrium proposal will give him
utility ¯ Vi (s,Pkl) for some l if k ≤ k|J| and ¯ Vi (s,s) if k>k |J|.H o w e v e r ,p r o p o s i n gψ (s) will give
39him a strictly higher utility ¯ Vi (s,ψ (s)), as shown above. Therefore, player i has a proﬁtable
deviation. This contradiction shows that the case where ψ(s)=Pkj does not hold for any j is
impossible, and thus ﬁnishes the proof that transition to state ψ(s) takes place in one step, so
that ψ(s)=χ(s).
Proof that ψ satisﬁes Axiom 3. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that Axiom 3 does not
hold. This implies that there exists state s,z ∈ S such that ψ(z)=z, z Âs s (which implies
z 6= s), and z Âs ψ(s) (which implies ψ(z) ¿ ψ(s)) . A sb e f o r e ,w ec a np r o v et h a ti fPk = z
for some k,t h e np r o p o s a lPk must be accepted. In particular, accepting proposal z will lead to
utility ¯ Vi (s,z)=βwi (z) for any player i, while rejecting can lead to one of two possible payoﬀs.
These possible payoﬀsa r e :
Case (i): ¯ Vi (s,Pkl) ≤ βwi (ψ(s)) for some l if J 6= ∅ and k<k |J|;
Case (ii): ¯ Vi (s,s)=( 1− β)wi (s)+βm(s)+1wi (ψ(s)) ≤ (1 − β)wi (s)+βwi (ψ(s)) if J = ∅
or k>k |J|.
T h ef a c tt h a t( b yh y p o t h e s i s )z Âs ψ(s) implies that {i : wi (z) >w i (ψ(s))} ∈ Ws (that is,
players that obtain higher stage payoﬀ from z than from ψ(s) form a winning coalition in s).
In case (i), from (A5),w eh a v e
¯ Vi (s,z)=βwi (z) >β w i (ψ (s)) ≥ ¯ Vi (s,Pkl).
In case (ii), because β>β 0 (recall (A1)), we have
βwi (z) ≥ (1 − β)wi (s)+βwi (ψ(s)),
and therefore ¯ Vi (s,z) > ¯ Vi (s,s).
We have therefore established that in both cases Lemma 1(c) applies and implies that pro-
posal Pk = z must be accepted. However, we have already shown that any proposals that are
proposed and accepted is mapped (by ψ)to equivalent states. Hence, if z is ever proposed, we
must have ψ (z) ∼ ψ(s).S i n c eψ(z) ¿ ψ(s), it must be the case that z is not proposed.
Assumption 4 now implies that either each state is proposed or that each player becomes
agenda-setter for some k. The former clearly cannot be the case, so suppose the latter applies.
Consider player i for whom wi (z) >w i (ψ(s)) and suppose that he is the agenda-setter at some
stage k. If he makes his equilibrium proposal, he receives either
¯ Vi (s,Pkl) ≤ βwi (ψ(s)),
where 1 ≤ l ≤ |J|,o r
¯ Vi (s,s)=( 1− β)wi (s)+βm(s)+1wi (ψ (s)) ≤ (1 − β)wi (s)+βwi (ψ (s)),
40depending on k ≤ k|J| or k>k |J|. Instead, if he proposes Pk = z,h ew i l lr e c e i v e
¯ Vi (s,z)=βwi (z) > max{βwi (ψ(s)),(1 − β)wi (s)+βwi (ψ(s))},
where the inequality follows from wi (z) >w i (ψ(s)) and β>β 0. This implies that player i has
ap r o ﬁtable deviation, yielding a contradiction. This establishes that ψ satisﬁes Axiom 3, and
thus completes the proof of part 2 of the Theorem.
(Part 3) This result immediately follows from Theorem 1 and part 2 of this Theorem. ¥
7.3 Proof of Theorem 3
The ﬁrst step is again a key lemma, which is of potential independent interest. This lemma
characterizes properties of quasi-median voters under more general political institutions (parallel
to the properties of median voters in majoritarian elections). For this lemma, recall that Ms
denotes the set of quasi-median voters in state s.
Lemma 2 Given I ⊂ R, S ⊂ R,p a y o ﬀ functions {wi (s)}i∈I,s∈S, and winning coalition
{Ws}s∈S satisfying Assumption 1, the following are true.
1. For each s,t h es e tMs is nonempty.
2. If the single-crossing property (SC) in Deﬁnition 5 holds, then for any states x,y,z ∈ S,
x Âz y ⇔ wi (x) >w i (y) for all i ∈ Mz,a n d
x ºz y ⇔ wi (x) ≥ wi (y) for all i ∈ Mz.
3. If monotonic median voter condition in Deﬁnition 8 holds, then there exists a sequence
{ms}s∈S of players such that ms ∈ Ms for all s ∈ S and whenever states x,y ∈ S satisfy
x<y , mx ≤ my.
Proof. (Part 1) Let b be such that B = {j ∈ I : −∞ <j≤ b} ∈ Ws and
{j ∈ I : −∞ <j<b } / ∈ Ws. Intuitively, such B is the “leftmost” winning coalition. Simi-
larly, let a be such that A = {j ∈ I : a ≤ j<∞} ∈ Ws and {j ∈ I : a<j<∞} / ∈ Ws,s ot h a t
A is the “rightmost” winning coalition. Assumption 1 implies that Z = A ∩ B 6= ∅.S i n c e
all quasi-median voters must be both in A and B,w ea l s oh a v eMs ⊂ Z. Next, we show that
Z ⊂ Ms is also true. To obtain a contradiction, assume the opposite. Then for some “con-
nected” coalition X = {j ∈ I : x ≤ j ≤ y} ∈ Ws the inclusion Z ⊂ X does not hold. Then,
evidently, either the lowest or the highest quasi-median voter is not in X. Suppose, without loss
of generality, the latter is the case. Since X is winning, coalition Y = {j ∈ I : −∞ <j≤ y}
41(where y is the highest player in X) is winning, and therefore Z ⊂ Y . But this implies that
the highest quasi-median voter is neither in X nor in Y , which is impossible and thus yields a
contradiction. This proves that Ms = Z 6= ∅.
(Part 2) Consider the case x ≥ y (the case x<yis treated similarly). Suppose x Âz y.
Then {i ∈ I : wx (i) >w y (i)} ∈ Wz (is winning in z). But by SC, this coalition is connected,
and therefore includes all players from Mz. Conversely, suppose that wi (x) >w i (y) for all
i ∈ Mz. Now SC implies that the same inequality holds for player j whenever j ≥ i ∈ Mz.
Part 1 of the Lemma implies that {j ∈ I : ∃i ∈ Mz such that j ≥ i} ∈ Wz.T h i s e s t a b l i s h e s
that wi (x) >w i (y) for all i ∈ Mz implies x Âz y, and completes the proof for this case. The
p r o o fo ft h er e s u l t sf o rt h eº relation is analogous.
(Part 3) By part 1 of this Lemma, the set Ms is nonempty for each s ∈ S.L e t




m.( A 6 )
Evidently, if x<y ,t h e nmx ≤ my.M o r e o v e r ,ms ∈ Ms. To prove this last statement, assume
the opposite; then ms =m i n m∈Mx for some x<s .S i n c e w e a s s u m e d ms / ∈ Ms, then either
ms ∈ Mx is less than all elements in Ms or greater than all elements in Ms.I nt h eﬁrst case,
ms < minm∈Ms m, which violates the deﬁnition of ms in (A6). In the second case, we ﬁnd that
Ms lies to the left of Mx, violating the monotonic median voter property. This contradiction
proves that ms ∈ Ms for all s ∈ S. Since the sequence (A6) is increasing, part 3 follows.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3( P a r t1 )We start with Assumption 2(a). Suppose that it does not
hold, and there is a cycle s1,...,s l such that sk+1 Âsk sk for 1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1 and s1 Âsl sl.
Take a monotonic sequence of median voters {ms}s∈S.R e c a l lt h a tms is part of any connected
winning coalition in s,t h e r e f o r e ,i ff o rs o m ex and z, x Âz z,t h e nwx (mz) >w z (mz).N o w
for each s ∈ S consider an alternative set of winning coalitions where ms is the dictator, i.e.,
W0
s = {X ∈ C : ms ∈ X}. Denoting the induced relation between states by Â0,w eh a v et h a t
if x Âz z,t h e nx Â0
z z. Consequently, if there was a cycle s1,...,s l such that sk+1 Âsk sk
for 1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1 and s1 Âsl sl,t h e nw eh a v esk+1 Â0
sk sk for 1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1 and s1 Â0
sl sl;
therefore, a cycle for Â0 exists. Now take the shortest cycle for Â0 (this need not be a cycle
for Â). Without loss of generality, suppose that s2 is the lowest state (so s2 ≤ s1 and s2 ≤ s3;
then ms2 ≤ ms1 and ms2 ≤ ms3.S i n c es3 Â0
s2 s2 and s2 Â0
s2 s1,w eh a v ewms2 (s3) >w ms2 (s2)
and wms1 (s2) >w ms1 (s1).B u t s2 ≤ s3 and ms2 ≤ ms1, hence, wms2 (s3) − wms2 (s2) > 0
implies wms1 (s3) − wms1 (s2) > 0, i.e., wms1 (s3) >w ms1 (s2). Combining this with wms1 (s2) >
wms1 (s1), we conclude that wms1 (s3) >w ms1 (s1).B u tt h e ns3 Â0
s1 s1,s i n c ems1 is the dictator
in s1. This implies that the link s2 may be skipped in the cycle, which contradicts the assumption
42that the cycle {sk}
l
k=1 was the shortest one. This contradiction establishes that Assumption
2(a) holds.
To show that Assumption 2(b) holds, take any s ∈ S and some ms ∈ Ms.F r o mL e m m a2
it follows that if for some x,y we have x Âs y,t h e nwms (x) >w ms (y). Suppose, to obtain a
contradiction, that there is a cycle s1,...,s l such that sk+1 Âs sk for 1 ≤ k ≤ l−1 and s1 Âs sl.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that state sl maximizes the payoﬀ of ms among states
s1,...,s l. This means that wms (sl) ≥ wms (s1), which implies s1 ¨s sl and thus contradicts the
existence of a cycle.This shows that Assumption 2(b) holds and completes the proof of part 1.
(Part 2) Note that if preferences of player i are single-peaked, then his preferences’ restricted
to any subset Q of S are also single-peaked. For any nonempty subset Q ⊂ S and i ∈ I,l e t
bi (Q) ∈ argmax
s∈Q
wi (s) (A7)
(in case this maximum is achieved at multiple states, we pick any of these).
We start with Assumption 2(a). Suppose there is a cycle s1,...,s l such that sk+1 Âsk sk
for 1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1 and s1 Âsl sl. Let us re-enumerate players in I as i1,...,i |I| so that
bik ({s1,...,s l}) is nondecreasing in k. It is straightforward to use the assumption that any two
winning coalitions, even for diﬀerent states, intersect, and prove that for this order there exists
aq u a s i - m e d i a nv o t e rim such that im ∈ X for any X ∈ C that satisﬁes X ∈ Wsk for some
1 ≤ k ≤ l and X = {ij ∈ I : ip ≤ ij ≤ iq} for some ip,i q ∈ I.L e tz = bim ({s1,...,s l}) be the
favorite state of quasi-median voter im. Then there exists sk such that sk Âz z. Without loss
of generality, assume sk >z . Because preferences are single-peaked, all players ip with p ≤ m,
including im,( w e a k l y )p r e f e rz to sk. By the choice of im, players who strictly prefer sk to z
do not form a winning coalition, which is a contradiction proving that Assumption 2(a) holds
in this case.
Now, suppose that Assumption 2(b) is violated, i.e., there exist s ∈ S and a cycle s1,...,s l
such that s0
k+1 Âs sk for 1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1 and s1 Âs sl. Again, we re-enumerate players in I,
so that bik ({s1,...,s l}) is nondecreasing for this new cycle s1,...,s l and choose im such that
im ∈ X for any X ∈ Ws such that X = {ij ∈ I : ip ≤ ij ≤ iq} for some ip,i q ∈ I.N o w t a k e
z = bim ({s1,...,s l}); then there exists sk such that sk Âs z. Without loss of generality, assume
sk >z .B u tt h e nsk Âs z is impossible, since all players ip with p ≤ m (weakly) prefer z to x.
This proves that Assumption 2(a,b) holds.
(Part 3) The case of part 1:T h e ﬁrst part of Assumption 2(b)* is shown similarly to
Assumption 2(b), making use of Assumption 5 to rule out indiﬀerences between x and y when
x ºz y.F i n a l l y , i f x,y ∈ S are such that x Âs s and y Âs x, then for any i ∈ Ms we have
wi (y) >w i (x) >w i (s), which, in turn, implies y Âs s.
43The case of part 2:T h eﬁrst part of Assumption 2(b)* is proved with an argument analogous
to part 2, but also making use of Assumption 5. To prove the last part, take states x,y,s such
that x Âs s and y Âs x; this implies that these three states are diﬀerent. Take the median
voter ms ∈ Ms. W em u s th a v ebms ({x,y,s})=y (with b deﬁn e db y( A 7 ) ) . T os e et h i sn o t e
that if bms ({x,y,s})=s,t h e nx Âs s would be impossible, and if bms ({x,y,s})=s,t h e n
y Âs x would not hold. Now consider two cases. First, suppose that either x,s > y or x,s < y.
Without loss of generality assume x,s > y,i nw h i c hc a s ex Âs s implies y<x<s .N o w ,w e
have that wi (y) >w i (x) i fa n do n l yi fbi ({x,y,s})=y, so such players form a winning coalition
in s.T h i si m p l i e sy Âs s. Second, suppose that either x<y<sor s<y<x . Without loss of
generality assume the former. Now, if a player prefers x to s,h em u s ta l s op r e f e ry to s;g i v e n
that x Âs s, we must therefore have y Âs s. In both cases, we have y Âs s, which completes the
proof. ¥
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46Appendix B: Limited Transitions (Not for Publication)
7.4 Modeling Limited Transitions
In the main body of the paper we assumed that any transition (from any state to any other state)
is possible. In certain applications, not all transitions across states may be possible. For example,
in Example 1 discussed in the Introduction, it may be that a transition to democracy is only
possible from constitutional monarchy (and not directly from absolutist monarchy). Another
more substantial example highlighting the importance of limited transitions is the model in
Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008), also discussed in subsection 6.4. In that model, only
current members of the ruling coalition can be part of future ruling coalitions and thus transitions
to states that include individuals previously eliminated are ruled out. Here in Appendix B we
show that our analysis, after proper reformulation of the Assumptions and the Axioms of Section
3, is applicable to the case where only certain state transitions are allowed and generalize the
r e s u l t si nT h e o r e m s1a n d2 .
The key to the analysis in this section is the binary relation Ã on the set of states S.F o r
any x,y ∈ S,w ew r i t ex Ã y to denote that a transition from x to y is possible and x Ã Q for
some Q ⊂ S to denote that the transition to any state z in Q is possible, provided that these
positions are supported by a winning coalition in x (similarly, Q1 Ã Q2). The analysis in the
main body of the paper thus corresponds to the special case where S Ã S for any x ∈ S.W e
adopt the following natural assumption on the transition relation.
Assumption 6 (Feasible Transitions) Relation Ã satisﬁes the following properties:
(a) (reﬂexivity) ∀x ∈ S : x Ã x;
(b) (transitivity) ∀x,y,z ∈ S : x Ã y and y Ã z imply x Ã z.
Part (b) Assumption 6 requires that if some indirect transition from x to z is feasible, so is
a direct transition between the states. Without requiring transitivity, there would be additional
technical details to take care of, because, for instance, if transition from x to z is possible through
y only, then it is only possible if both a winning coalition in x prefers z to x and a winning
coalition in y prefers z to y.16 Nevertheless, this assumption can be dispensed with, and we
could assume instead that whenever x Ã y and y Ã z but x 6Ã z,t h e nWx = Wy (or a weaker
version of this assumption).17
16See Chwe (1994) for another model where diﬀerent transitions require diﬀerent winning coalitions.
17One set of economically interesting cases in which Assumption 6 fails to hold includes economic games in
which there is a capital-stock-like variable, such as capital, that is determined as a result of the actions in the
current state (for example, capital accumulation, which might depend on the current enforcement of property
rights). Since our game does not involve such dynamic linkages, Assumption 6 is natural here. In particular,
47We next consider slightly weaker versions of Assumption 2 and Assumption 3, incorporating
the fact that only certain transitions are feasible (since when some transitions are not feasible,
it becomes easier to rule out cycles).
Assumption 20 (Payoﬀs with Limited Transitions) Payoﬀ functions {wi (s)}i∈I,s∈S sat-
isfy the following properties:
(a) For any sequence of states s1,...,s k in S with sj Ã sj+1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and
sk Ã s1,
sj+1 Âsj sj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1= ⇒ s1 ¨sk sk.
(b) For any sequence of states s,s1,...,s k in S with s Ã sj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, sk Ã s1,
and sj Âs s for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
sj+1 Âs sj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1= ⇒ s1 ¨s sk.
(b)* For any sequence of states s,s1,...,s k in S with s Ã sj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, sj ¿ sl
for some 1 ≤ j<l≤ k,a n dsj Âs s for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
sj+1 ºs sj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1= ⇒ s1 ²s sk.
M o r e o v e r ,i ff o rx,y,s ∈ S we have s Ã x, s Ã y, x Âs s and y ¨s s,t h e ny ¨s x.
Assumption 30 (Comparability with Limited Transitions) For x,y,s ∈ S such that s Ã
x, s Ã y, x Âs s, y Âs s,a n dx ¿ y,e i t h e ry Âs x or x Âs y.
Finally, let us reformulate Axioms 1—3 for this slightly modiﬁed set up (note that Axiom 3
is unchanged, though we state it again for completeness).
Axiom 10 (Desirability) If x,y ∈ S are such that y = φ(x),t h e ne i t h e ry = x or x Ã y and
y Âx x.
Axiom 20 (Stability) If x,y ∈ S are such that y = φ(x),t h e ny = φ(y).
Axiom 30 (Rationality) If x,y,z ∈ S are such that x Ã z, z Âx x, z = φ(z),a n dz Âx y,
then y 6= φ(x).
With this new set of Axioms, a slightly modiﬁed version of Theorem 1 holds:
there is no reason for a suﬃciently powerful coalition not to be able to implement a change that is feasible in
the continuation game. An interesting model of a gradual dynamic enfranchisement where capital accumulation
changes agents’ preferences over time is provided in Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2006).
48Theorem 4 (Dynamically Stable States with Limited Transitions) Suppose that binary
relation Ã satisﬁes Assumption 6, and that Assumptions 1 and 20 hold. Then:
1. There exists mapping φ satisfying Axioms 10—30.





with the property that for any 1 ≤ j<l≤ |S|,e i t h e rμj 6Ã μl












μk if Mk = ∅
s ∈ Mk :@z ∈ Mk with μk Ã z and z Âμk s if Mk 6= ∅
.
3. For any two mappings φ1 and φ2 that satisfy Axioms 10—30 the stable states of these map-
pings coincide.
4. If, in addition, Assumption 30 holds, then the mapping that satisﬁes Axioms 10—30 is
“payoﬀ-unique” in the sense that for any two mappings φ1 and φ2 that satisfy Axioms
10—30 and for any s ∈ S, φ1 (s) ∼ φ2 (s).
Proof. The proof is an extension of that of Theorem 1. The idea of the proof is to construct a
mapping (sequence) μ : {1,...,|S|} ↔ S such that for any 1 ≤ k<|S| we have that
if 1 ≤ j<l≤ |S|,t h e nμj 6Ã μl or μl ¨μj μj.( B 1 )
To construct mapping μ, we introduce a binary relation ! deﬁned as
x ! y i fa n do n l yi fx Ã y and y Ã x.
Assumption 6 guarantees that ! is an equivalence relation, inducing equivalence classes
{Ex}x∈S deﬁned as
Ex = {y ∈ S : x ! y}
to be such that Ex and Ey either coincide or do not intersect. The binary relation Ã on elements
of S induces relation Ã in equivalence classes by letting Ex Ã Ey i fa n do n l yi fx Ã y;n o t e
that this relation is well-deﬁned in the sense that it does not depend on the elements x and
y picked from Ex and Ey, respectively. Furthermore, this relation is acyclical in the sense that
there do not exist distinct classes E1,...,El such that Ej Ã Ej+1 for 1 ≤ j<land El Ã E1.
49Consequently, we can form a sequence of all equivalence classes E1,...,Em (where m is the
number of classes) such that Ej 6Ã Ek for any 1 ≤ j<k≤ m.N o w ,w i t h i ne a c hc l a s sEk,w e
enumerate its elements as μk
1,...,μ k
|Ek| so that μk
l ¨μk
j μk
j for 1 ≤ j<l≤
¯ ¯Ek¯ ¯ (this is feasible
due to Assumption 20(a)). Next, construct the sequence μ as follows: we give members of class






,t h e nw e
take members of class E2 as they are listed in the sequence μ2, and so on. It is easy to show
that the sequence μ constructed in this way satisﬁes (B1). The rest of the proof closely follows
the one of Theorem 1 and is omitted.
Similarly, an equivalent of Theorem 2 again applies.
Theorem 5 (Noncooperative Foundations of Dynamically Stable States with Lim-
ited Transitions) Suppose that binary relation Ã satisﬁes Assumption 6, that Assumptions 1,
20(a),(b) and 4 hold. Then there exists β0 ∈ [0,1) such if the discount factor β>β 0,t h e n :
1. For any mapping φ : S → S satisfying Axioms 10—30 there exists a set of protocols {πs}s∈S
and a pure-strategy MPE σ of the game such that st = φ(s0) for any t ≥ 1; that is, the
game reaches φ(s0) after one period and stays in this state thereafter. Therefore, s = φ(s0)
is a dynamically stable state.
Moreover, suppose that Assumption 20(b)* holds. Then:
2. For any set of protocols {πs}s∈S there exists a pure-strategy MPE. Any such MPE σ has
the property that for any initial state s0 ∈ S, st = s∞ for all t ≥ 1.M o r e o v e r , t h e r e
exists mapping φ : S → S satisfying Axioms 10—30 such that s∞ = φ(s0).T h e r e f o r e ,a l l
dynamically stable states are axiomatically stable.
3. If, in addition, Assumption 30 holds, then the MPE is essentially unique in the sense that
f o ra n ys e to fp r o t o c o l s{πs}s∈S, any pure-strategy MPE σ induces st ∼ φ(s0) for all t ≥ 1,
where φ satisﬁes Axioms 10—30.
Proof. The proof is essentially identical to that of Theorem 2 and is omitted.
These theorems therefore show that the essential results of Theorems 1 and 2 generalize
to an environment with limited transitions. The intuition for these results and the recursive
characterization of dynamically stable states are essentially identical to those in Theorems 1
and 2.
507.5 Generalization of Proposition 4
We now show how Proposition 4 can be generalized by allowing only certain types of transitions.
This generalization makes the political elimination model of Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008)
(and its extension to inﬁnite horizon) also a special case of the analysis here.
Proposition 5 Consider the environment in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008). Then:
1. Assumptions 1, 20,3 0,a n d6a r es a t i s ﬁed (provided that X Ã Y is feasible if and only if
Y ⊂ X).
2. There exists an arbitrarily small perturbation of payoﬀs such that Assumption 20(b)* holds.
3. If only eliminations are possible, there exists a unique outcome mapping φelim that satisﬁes
Axioms 10—30. This mapping yields the same equilibrium (dynamically stable) states as in
Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008).
4. In the case where any transition is feasible (as in Proposition 4 in the text), there exists a
unique outcome mapping φ that satisﬁes Axioms 1—3. This mapping is potentially diﬀerent
from φelim.
Proof. (Part 1) Assumption 1 is satisﬁed by Proposition 4 (part 1), since it has not changed.
Assumptions 20 and 30 are in fact weaker than corresponding Assumptions 2 and 3, because in
the latter two, all transitions are allowed, which makes the set of potential cycles larger. Finally,
if transitions X Ã Y and Y Ã Z are feasible, then Y ⊂ X and Z ⊂ Y , hence Z ⊂ X,a n d
therefore transition X Ã Z is feasible, so Assumption 6 is satisﬁed.
(Part 2) The proof of this result is very similar to the proof of part 2 of Proposition 4 and
is omitted.
(Part 3) Existence and uniqueness of a mapping φelim that satisﬁes Axioms 10—30 follows
from part 1, since Theorem 1 is applicable. Similarly, in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008)
it is shown that under these assumptions, there exists a unique outcome correspondence φaes
that satisfy Axiom 1—4 of that paper This correspondence φaes is single-valued due to genericity
assumption, so below, we will treat φaes as a mapping, not a correspondence. To prove that
φelim = φ it suﬃces to show that mapping φelim satisﬁes Axiom 1—4 of that paper. For Axiom 1
(Inclusion): Take any X;A x i o m1 0 implies that either φelim (X)=X or X Ã φelim (X).I nb o t h
cases, φelim (X) ⊂ X.F o rA x i o m2 (Power): Again, Axiom 10 implies that either φelim (X)=X
or X Ã φelim (X) and φelim (X) ÂX X.I nb o t hc a s e s ,φelim (X) ⊂ X and γφelim(X) >α γ X,s o
φelim (X) ∈ WX in the notation of that paper. Axiom 3 (Self-Enforcement): Take any X and
51let Y = φelim (X).A x i o m 2 0 implies φelim (Y )=φelim (φelim (X)) = φelim (X)=Y . Finally,
Axiom 4 (Rationality): Take any X, Y = φelim (X), and suppose that Z ∈ WX (meaning
that Z ⊂ X and γZ >α γ X)a n dZ = φelim (Z).I fγY <γ Z,t h e nw eh a v eX Ã Y , Y ÂX X,
Y = φelim (Y ) by Axiom 20,a n dY ÂX Z.A x i o m3 0 then implies that Z 6= φelim (X). Conversely,
if γZ ≤ γY ,t h e nγZ = γY ,f o rγZ <γ Y would imply that X Ã Z, Z ÂX X, Z = φelim (Z),
and Z ÂX Y , in which case we would get a contradiction with Y = φelim (X),a sA x i o m3 0
would imply Y 6= φelim (Y ).B u t γZ = γY , together with genericity, implies Z = Y ,a n d
hence Z = φelim (X).T h i sp r o v e st h a tA x i o m s1—4 of Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2008) are
satisﬁed, hence, φelim = φaes.
(Part 4) Existence and uniqueness follow from Proposition 4 (part 1). To show that the two
mappings, φelim and φ may be diﬀerent, consider four individuals, A,B,C,Z with powers γA =3 ,
γB =4 , γC =5 , γD =4 .5. It is straightforward to verify that φelim ({A,B,C})={A,B,C}, but
φ({A,B,C})={A,B,Z}. Moreover, it is possible that for some coalition X, φelim (X) ⊂ X and
φ(X) ⊂ X, but φ(X) 6= φelim (X): this would be the case for six players A,B,C,D,E,F with
powers 100,101,103,107,115,131, respectively (here, φelim ({A,B,C,D,E,F})={A,B,F},
but φ({A,B,C,D,E,F})={D,E,F}). In fact, {A,B,F} is the winning coalition in
{A,B,C,D,E,F} with the least power; it also happens to be φelim-stable. However, it is
not φ-stable (φ({A,B,F})={A,B,C}) ,a n di nt h i sc a s e{D,E,F} is the φ-stable winning
coalition with the least total power (in {A,B,C,D,E,F}).
52Appendix C: Examples, Proofs From Section 6 and Additional
Results (Not for Publication)
Deﬁnition of MPE
Consider a general n-person inﬁnite-stage game, where each individual can take an action at






for i =1 ,...,n,w i t h
at
i ∈ At
i and ai ∈ Ai =
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t=1 At
i.L e tht =
¡
a1,...,a t¢
be the history of play up to stage t (not
including stage t), where as =( as
1,...,a s
n),s oh0 is the history at the beginning of the game,
and let Ht be the set of histories ht for t :0≤ t ≤ T − 1.











for i =1 ,...,n,w i t ht h es e to fc o n -
tinuation action proﬁles for player i denoted by Ai.t.S y m m e t r i c a l l y ,d e ﬁne t-truncated action







for i =1 ,...,n,w i t ht h es e to ft-truncated action proﬁles
for player i denoted by Ai,−t. We also use the standard notation ai and a−i to denote the action
proﬁles for player i and the action proﬁles of all other players (similarly, Ai and A−i). The payoﬀ




A pure strategy for player i is
σi : H∞ → Ai.
A t-continuation strategy for player i (corresponding to strategy σi) speciﬁes plays only after
time t (including time t), i.e.,
σi,t : H∞ \ Ht−2 → Ai,t,
where H∞ \ Ht−2 is the set of histories starting at time t.
We then have:





for all τ ≥ t,w h e n e v e rht−1,˜ hτ−1 ∈ H∞ are such that for any ai,t,˜ ai,τ ∈ Ai,t and any a−i,t ∈
A−i,t,








˜ ai,τ,a −i,t | ˜ hτ−1
´
.
53Markov perfect equilibria in pure strategies are deﬁned formally as follows:
Deﬁnition 10 (MPE) Ap u r es t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle ˆ σ =( ˆ σ1,...,ˆ σn) is Markov perfect equilib-
rium (MPE) (in pure strategies) if each strategy ˆ σi is Markovian and
ui (ˆ σi, ˆ σ−i) ≥ ui (ˆ σi, ˆ σ−i) for all σi ∈ Σi and for all i =1 ,...,n.
Examples
Example 3 (Nonexistence without Transaction Costs) In this example, we show that
a MPE in pure strategies may fail to exist if we assume away the transaction cost. There
are 8 states S = {A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H} and 7 players. The set of winning coalitions are:
WA = {X ∈ C : |{1,2,3} ∩ X| ≥ 2} (i.e., majority voting between 1,2,3), WB =[ 4 ] , WD =[ 5 ] ,
WF =[ 6 ] , WC = WE = WG = WH =[ 7 ](here, [i] denotes the set of winning coalitions where i is
the dictator, so [i]={X ∈ C : i ∈ X}). The payoﬀsa r ea sf o l l o w s :w1 (·)=( 0 ,30,0,0,20,0,0,1),
w2 (·)=( 0 ,0,0,30,0,0,20,1), w3 (·)=( 0 ,0,20,0,0,30,0,1), w4 (·)=( 0 ,0,1,0,0,0,0,0),
w5 (·)=( 0 ,0,0,0,1,0,0,0), w6 (·)=( 0 ,0,0,0,0,0,1,0), w7 (·)=( 0 ,0,0,0,0,0,0,1).I t i s
straightforward to show that Assumptions 1, 2 and 2b* are satisﬁed (it is helpful to notice
that the only state s that satisﬁes s ÂA A is s = H).
Evidently, state H is stable (dictator 7 will never deviate), and similarly any of the states
E,F,G will immediately lead to H.I ti sa l s oe v i d e n tt h a tB will immediately lead to C, because
C is the only state where dictator 4 receives a positive utility; similarly, D immediately leads
to E and F immediately leads to G. L e tu sp r o v et h a tn om o v ef r o ms t a t eA can form a
pure-strategy equilibrium. First, it is impossible to stay in A:p l a y e r s1,2,3 would be better oﬀ
moving to H.M o v i n gt oH immediately is not possible in an equilibrium either: Then players
1 and 3 would rather deviate and move to B, which would then lead to C and only then to H,
since the average payoﬀ of this path would be higher for each of these players (recall that the
discount factor is close to 1).
Let us consider possible moves to B and C (the moves to D,E,F,G are considered similarly).
If the state were to change to C,t h e np l a y e r s1 and 2 would rather deviate and move to D (and
then to E,f o l l o w e db yH). Finally, if the state were to change to B,t h e n2 and 3 could deviate
to F,s oa st of o l l o wt h ep a t ht oG and H after that; this is better for these players than
moving to B,f o l l o w e db yC and H. So, without imposing a transaction cost it is possible that
a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist.
54Example 4 (Cycles without Transaction Costs) In this example, we show that in the
absence of transaction cost, an equilibrium may involve a cycle even though Assumptions 1, 2
and 2b* hold. There are 6 players, I = {1,2,3,4,5,6},a n d3 states, S = {A,B,C}.P l a y -
ers’ preferences are given by w1 (A,B,C)=( 5 ,10,4), w2 (A,B,C)=( 5 ,4,10), w3 (A,B,C)=
(4,5,10), w4 (A,B,C)=( 1 0 ,5,4), w5 (A,B,C)=( 1 0 ,4,5), w3 (A,B,C)=( 4 ,10,5), and win-
ning coalitions are deﬁned by WA = {X ∈ C :1 ,2 ∈ X}, WB = {X ∈ C :3 ,4 ∈ X}, WC =
{X ∈ C :5 ,6 ∈ X}.T h e no n ec a ns e et h a tt h e r ei sa ne q u i l i b r i u mw h i c hi n v o l v e sm o v i n gf r o m
state A to state B,f r o mB to C,a n df r o mC to A. To see this, because of the symmetry it
suﬃces to see that the players will not deviate if the current state is A. The alternatives are to
stay in A or move to C.B u ts t a y i n g i n A hurts both player 1 and player 2 (for player 2 who
dislikes state B this is true because it postpones the move to C, the state that he likes best,
while for player 1 this is evident). At the same time, moving to C hurts player 1, because state
C is the worst of the three states for him not only in terms of instantaneous payoﬀ, but also
in terms of discounted present value (if the cycle continues, as it should due to the one-stage
deviation principle). So, this cycle constitutes a (Markov Perfect) equilibrium.
It is also easy to see that in this example, Assumptions 1, 2 and 2b* are satisﬁed: in fact, there
are no two states s,s0 ∈ {A,B,C} such that s Âs0 s0. Finally, notice that the aforementioned
cycle is not the only equilibrium. In particular, the cycle in the opposite direction may also arise
in an equilibrium (this holds because of symmetry), and situation where all three states are
stable is also possible (indeed, if B and C are stable, then players 1 will always block transition
from A to C whereas player 2 will always block transition from A to B).
Example 5 (Nonexistence without Assumption 2(a)) There are 3 players, I = {1,2,3},
and 3 states, S = {A,B,C}. Players’ preferences satisfy w1 (A) >w 1 (B) >w 1 (C),
w2 (B) >w 2 (C) >w 2 (A),a n dw3 (C) >w 3 (A) >w 3 (B) (for example, w1 (A,B,C)=
(10,8,5), w2 (A,B,C)=( 5 ,10,8), w3 (A,B,C)=( 8 ,5,10)). Winning coalitions are given
by WA = {X ∈ C :3∈ X}, WB = {X ∈ C :1∈ X}, WA = {X ∈ C :2∈ X} (in other words,
states A,B,C have dictators 1,2,3, respectively). We then have A ÂB B, B ÂC C, C ÂA A,s o
Assumption 2(a) is violated.
It is easy to see that there are no dynamically stable states in the dynamic game in this case.
To see this, suppose that state A is dynamically stable, then state B is not, since player 1 would
enforce transition to A. Therefore, state C is stable: player 2, who is the dictator in C,k n o w s
that a transition to B will lead to A, which is worse than C. However, then player 3, knowing
that C is stable, will have an incentive to move from A to C. In equilibrium this deviation
55should not be proﬁtable, but it is; hence, there is no equilibrium where A is stable. Now, given
the transition costs, there is no MPE in pure strategies, since if no state is dynamically stable,
the players would beneﬁt from blocking every single transition in every single state.
Let us now formally show that there is no mapping φ that satisﬁes Axioms 1—3. Assume
that there is such mapping φ. By Axiom 2, there is a stable state (for any state s, φ(s) is
stable). Without loss of generality, suppose that A is such a state: φ(A)=A.T h e ns t a t eC is
not stable: if it were, we would obtain a contradiction with Axiom 3, since C ÂA A.I fC is not
stable, then either φ(C)=A or φ(C)=B.T h eﬁrst is impossible by Axiom 1, since player 2,
who is a member of any winning coalition in C,h a sw2 (C) >w 2 (A). Therefore, φ(C)=B,
and by Axiom 2, φ(B)=B. But we have A ÂB B and φ(A)=A; this means, by Axiom 3,
that φ(B)=B cannot hold. This contradiction shows that with these preferences, there is no
mapping φ that satisﬁes Axioms 1—3.
Example 6 (Nonexistence without Assumption 2(b)) There are 3 players, I = {1,2,3},
and 4 states, S = {A,B,C,D}. Players’ preferences satisfy w1 (A) >w 1 (B) >w 1 (C) >
w1 (D), w2 (B) >w 2 (C) >w 2 (A) >w 2 (D),a n dw3 (C) >w 3 (A) >w 3 (B) >w 3 (D)
(for example, w1 (A,B,C,D)=( 1 0 ,8,5,4), w2 (A,B,C,D)=( 5 ,10,8,4), w3 (A,B,C,D)=
(8,5,10,4)). Winning coalitions are given by WA = WB = WC = {I} = {{1,2,3}},
WD = {{1,2},{1,3},{2,3},{1,2,3}} (in other words, in states A,B,C there is unanimity
voting rule, while in state D there is majority voting rule). We then have A ÂD D, A ÂD D,
A ÂD D and A ÂD B, B ÂD C, C ÂD A, so Assumption 2(b) is violated. Assume, in addition,
that KD =3 ,a n dπD (1) = C, πD (2) = B, πD (3) = A.
In this case, states A,B,C are dynamically stable: evidently, player who receives 10 (1,2,3,
respectively) will block transition to any other state. Consider state D; it is easy to see that
it is not dynamically stable. Indeed, if it were, then all three players would be better oﬀ from
transition to either of the three other states A,B,C, so they must vote for any such proposal in
equilibrium. Now that it is not dynamically stable, we must have that some of proposals C,B,A
are accepted in equilibrium. Suppose that A is accepted, then B may not be accepted (because
two players, 1 and 3,s t r i c t l yp r e f e rA to B), and therefore C must be accepted (because two
players, 2 and 3,s t r i c t l yp r e f e rC to A). But then A may not be accepted, as players 2 and 3
would prefer to have it rejected so that C is accepted in the next period, and by Lemma 1(c)
A must be rejected in the equilibrium. This contradicts our assertion that A is accepted, and
we would obtain a similar contradiction if we assumed that some other proposal is accepted.
Hence, there is no MPE in pure strategies in this case.
56We now show that there is no mapping φ that satisﬁes Axioms 1—3. Assume that there is
such mapping φ. Since for each of the states A,B,C there is no state that is preferred to it by
all three players, then Axiom 1 implies that φ(A)=A, φ(B)=B,a n dφ(C)=C.C o n s i d e r
state D.I fφ(D)=D, this would violate Axiom 3, since, for instance, state A satisﬁes A ÂD D
and φ(A)=A. Hence, φ(D) 6= D; without loss of generality assume φ(D)=A.B u tt h e ns t a t e
C satisﬁes C ÂD A, C ÂD D,a n dφ(C)=C. By Axioum 3 we cannot have φ(D)=A.T h i s
contradiction proves that there does not exist mapping φ that satisﬁes Axioms 1—3.
Example 7 (Multiple Equilibria without Assumption 3) There are 2 players, I = {1,2},
and 3 states, S = {A,B,C}. Players’ preferences satisfy w1 (A) >w 1 (B) >w 1 (C),
w2 (B) >w 2 (A) >w 2 (C) (for example, w1 (A,B,C)=( 5 ,3,1), w2 (A,B,C)=( 3 ,5,1)).
Winning coalitions are given by WA = WB = WC = {I} = {{1,2}} (in other words, there is a
unanimity voting rule in all states A,B,C). Then Assumptions 1 and 2(a,b) are satisﬁed, while
Assumption 3 is violated (both A and B are preferred to C, but neither A ÂC B nor B ÂC A).
One can easily see that in this case there exist two mappings, φ1 and φ2, which satisfy Axioms
1—3.L e t φ1 (A)=φ1 (C)=A and φ1 (B)=B.L e t φ2 (A)=A and φ2 (B)=φ2 (C)=B.
Mappings φ1 and φ2 diﬀer in only that the ﬁrst one maps state C to state A,a n dt h es e c o n d
one maps state C to state A. It is straightforward to verify that φ1 and φ2 satisfy Axioms 1—3,
and also that no other mapping satisﬁes these Axioms. Note that the sets of stable states under
these two mappings satisfy Dφ1 = {A,B} = Dφ2, as they should according to Theorem 1.
Proofs of Propositions From Section 6
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1( P a r t1 )Take msk =( k +1 )/2 if k is odd and ms = k/2 if k is




sk where k/2 <l k ≤ k for all k, msk is
a quasi-median voter and, moreover, the sequence {msk}
N
k=1 is monotonically increasing.




sk where k/2 <l k ≤ k, Assumption 1 trivially
holds. From part 1 it follows that Theorem 3 (part 1) is applicable, so Assumption 2(a,b) holds.
Finally, Assumption 2b* follows from 5, as Theorem 3 (part 3) is applicable in this case.
(Part 3) In an odd-sized club sk, median voter is a single person (k +1 )/2,a n di nt h ec a s e
of majority voting, we have sl Âsk sk i fa n do n l yi fw(k+1)/2 (sl) >w (k+1)/2 (sk) because of the
single-crossing condition. In either case, if sl and sj are two diﬀerent clubs, player (k +1 )/2 is
not indiﬀerent between them by Assumption 5. This implies that either sl Âsk sj of sj Âsk sl
for any sj and sl, which completes the proof. ¥
57P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .( P a r t1 )Assumption 1 holds in each club sk, because the voting
rule is simple majority. To show that Assumption 2(a) holds, we notice that it is impossible to
have sl Âsk sk for l>k , because all members of sk prefer sk to sl. Therefore, any cycle that
we hypothesize to exist will break at its smallest club. To show that Assumption 2(b) holds,
take any club s = sk. The set of clubs {sl} that satisfy sl Âsk sk is the set of clubs that satisfy
k/2 <l≤ k. Hence, for any clubs sl, sm with l<mthat satisfy sl Âsk sk and sm Âsk sk we
have sl Âsk sm: indeed, players i ∈ {1,...,l} which form a simple majority will prefer sl to sm,
as they are included in both clubs, but prefer the smaller one. Therefore, sm Âsk sl is impossible
for l<m , which proves that Assumption 2(b) holds. Likewise, sm ºsk sl is impossible, so the
ﬁrst part of Assumption 2b* holds as well.
Let us now take sl Âsk sk and sm ¨sk sk. This means k/2 <l≤ k, and either m ≤ k/2 or
m ≥ k.I fm ≤ k/2, then the set of members of club sk who prefer sm to sl is {1,...,m}:t h o s e
who belong to sl but not to sm prefer sl, while those who do not belong to either of sm and
sl are indiﬀerent. So, players only players in sm may strictly prefer sm to sl. But they do not
constitute at least half of the club in sk,s osm ¨sk sl. Consider the second case, m ≥ k.B u t
then all players in sl (i.e., a majority) will prefer sl to sm, and therefore sm ¨sk sl.W e h a v e
proved that Assumption 2b* holds.
Finally, to show that Assumption 3 holds, take s = sk, sl and sm such that sl Âsk sk,
sm Âsk sk,a n dsl ¿ sm. Without loss of generality assume l<m . But then sl Âsk sm,s i n c ea l l
players from sl prefer sl,a n dt h e yf o r mam a j o r i t yi nsk. This proves that Assumption 3 holds.
(Part 2) Monotonic median voter property holds, since we can take msk to be player k/2
if k is even and (k +1 )/2 is odd; clearly, {msk}
N
k=1 is an increasing sequence of quasi-median
voters. To show that the single-crossing condition holds, take i,j ∈ I such that i<jand
sk,s l ∈ S with k<l . Suppose wi (sl) >w i (sk).T h i si sp o s s i b l ei fi ∈ sl but i/ ∈ sk or i/ ∈ sk,s l.
In either case, i/ ∈ sk, and therefore j/ ∈ sk. But then wj (sl) >w j (sk). Suppose now that
wj (sl) <w j (sk); this means that j ∈ sk,s l. But then i ∈ sk,s l, and therefore wi (sl) <w i (sk).
This establishes that the single-crossing condition holds.
(Part 3) Notice that it is never possible that sl Âsk sk if k<l . We can therefore start with
smaller clubs. Club s1 is stable and 1=2 0. Suppose we proved the statement for j<kand
now consider club sk.I f log2 k/ ∈ Z,t h e nc l u bsj for j =2 blog2 kc is stable and contains more
than half members of sk. Hence, sk is unstable. Conversely, if log2 k ∈ Z, then the only clubs
we know to be stable do not contain more than k/2 members, so sk is stable. This proves the
induction step.
(Part 4) If log2 k ∈ Z,t h e n2blog2 kc = k, and the statement follows from part 3.I flog2 k/ ∈ Z,
then s2blog2 kc is the only club which is preferred to sk by a majority (other stable clubs are either
58larger than sk or at least twice as small as s2blog2 kc, i.e., more than two times smaller than sk).
The result follows. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . ( P a r t1 )Assumption 1 follows from b>N / 2. Therefore,
Theorem 3 applies and Assumption 2(a,b) and 2b* are satisﬁed.
(Part 2) By part 1, Theorem 1 is applicable. The result immediately follows.
(Part 3) We prove this result for constitutions and voting rules simultaneously. By de-
ﬁnition, a voting rule (constitution) (a,b) is self-stable (or self-stable, in terminology of Bar-
bera and Jackson) if |i ∈ I : wi (a0) >w i (a)| <bfor all feasible a0. But this is equivalent to
(a0,b 0) ¨(a,b) (a,b) for all (a,b),w h i c hi st h ed e ﬁnition of myopic stability. By Corollary 1, any
myopically stable state is dynamically stable, but not vice versa, which establishes the result.
(Part 4) In light of part 3 we only need to prove that any dynamically stable state is
myopically stable. Take any constitution (a,b) which is not myopically stable; let us prove that
φc [(a,b)] 6=( a,b). Consider the set of constitutions Q = {(a0,b 0)} such that (a0,b 0) Â(a,b) (a,b);
since (a,b) is unstable, this set is nonempty. Note that if (a0,b 0) ∈ Q,t h e n(a0,N) ∈ Q (because
the second part of the pair of rules does not enter the utility directly). Now take some player i and
(a0,b 0) ∈ Q that is most preferred by i among the states within Q (or one of such states if there
are several of these). Consider state (a0,N) ∈ Q. First, since it lies in Q, (a0,N) Â(a,b) (a,b).
Second, this state is φc-stable: indeed, if it were not the case, we would have some other
(a00,b 00) Â(a0,N) (a0,N). This means that each player prefers (a00,b 00) to (a0,N), which of course
implies that at least a players prefer (a00,b 00) to (a,b),s o(a00,b 00) ∈ Q. But there is player i
who at least weakly prefers (a0,b 0) (and therefore (a0,N), which is the same as far as immediate
payoﬀs are concerned) to any other element in Q. This means that such (a00,b 00) does not exist,
and state (a0,N) is stable. Axiom 3 then implies that φc (a,b) cannot equal (a,b),s i n c es t a t e
(a0,N) is φc-stable and is preferred to (a,b). This completes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. (Part 1) Assumption 1 immediately follows from (18) and that
α ≥ 1/2. To prove that Assumption 2(a) holds, it suﬃces to notice that Y ÂX X is impossible if
γY >γ X, so any cycle would break at the least powerful coalition in it (which is unique because
of genericity). Similarly, to prove that Assumption 2(b) holds, one can notice that if Y ÂX X
and Z ÂX X,t h e nγY >γ Z implies Z ÂX Y , and thus Y ¨X Z: indeed, all players in Z
prefer Z to Y , and they form a winning coalition in X, for if they did not, Z ÂX X would be
impossible. Again, this means that any cycle would break at the least powerful coalition in it.
One can similarly show that Assumption 3 holds: is proved likewise: if Y ÂX X and Z ÂX X,
then, by genericity, X ¿ Y implies γY 6= γZ. Without loss of generality, γY >γ Z, and in this
case Z ÂX Y . Hence, Assumption 3 is satisﬁed.
59(Part 2) Let us perturb players’ payoﬀss ot h a ti fi/ ∈ X,t h e nwi (X)=εγX where ε>0 is
small. After this perturbation, Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 still hold, as the proofs from part 1 are
still valid. The ﬁrst part of Assumption 2b* follows, for if a corresponding º-cycle existed, then
by genericity we would get a Â-cycle which is ruled out by Assumption 2(b). To show that the
second part of Assumption 2b* holds, take Y ÂX X and Z ¨X X.T h i si m p l i e sαγX <γ Y <γ X
and either γZ ≤ αγX or γZ >γ X.I fγZ ≤ αγX, all players who are not in Z prefer Y to Z:
this is obviously true for the part that belongs to Y , while if a player is neither in Y nor in Z,
this is true because of the perturbation we made, for in this case γY >α γ X ≥ γZ. Since players
in Z do not form a winning coalition in this case, we have Z ¨X Y . Consider the second case
where γZ >γ X; then all players in Y prefer Y to Z,s i n c eγY <γ Z. This means that Y ÂX Z
and thus Z ¨X Y . This proves that Assumption 2b* holds, which completes the proof. ¥
The Relationship Between D, von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set, and
Chwe’s Largest Consistent Set
The following deﬁnitions are from Chwe (1994) and von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
Deﬁnition 11 (Consistent Sets) For any x,y ∈ S and any X ∈ C,d e ﬁne relation →X by
x →X y if and only if either x = y or x 6= y and X ∈ Wx.
1. We say that state x is directly dominated by y (and write x<y )i ft h e r ee x i s t sX ∈ C
such that x →X y and x ≺X y, where we write x ≺X y as a shorthand for wi (x) <w i (y)
for all i ∈ X.
2. We say that state x is indirectly dominated by y (and write x ¿ y)i ft h e r ee x i s t
x0,x 1,...,x m ∈ S such that x0 = x and xm = y and X0,X 1,...,X m−1 ∈ C such that
xj →Sj xj+1 and xj ≺Sj y for j =0 ,1,...,m− 1.
3. A set S ⊂ S is called consistent if x ∈ S if and only if ∀y ∈ S,∀X ∈ C such that x →X y
there exists z ∈ S,w h e r ey = z or y ¿ z, such that x ⊀X z.
Deﬁnition 12 (von Neumann-Morgenstern’s Stable Set)A set of states X ⊂ S is von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable if it satisﬁes the following properties:
1. (Internal stability) For any x,y ∈ X we have y ¨x x;
2. (External stability) For any x ∈ S\X there exists y ∈ X such that y Âx x.
Proposition 6 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then:
601. The set of stable states D is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set;
2. D is the largest consistent set;
3. Any consistent set is either D or any subset of the set of exogenously stable states (and
vice versa, all such sets are consistent).




satisfying (7). Suppose that set
of states X is von Neumann-Morgenstern stable; let us prove that X = D. Clearly, μ1 ∈ X,









for some k ≥ 2; let us prove that μk ∈ X i fa n do n l yi fμk ∈ D.F r o m
Theorem 1 it follows that it suﬃces to prove that μk ∈ X i fa n do n l yi fMk = ∅. Suppose ﬁrst




by construction, we have that μl Âμk μk
for some l<ksuch that μl ∈ X. Hence, if μk ∈ X, then internal stability property would





= ∅, and therefore there does not exist μl ∈ X such that l<kand μl Âμk μk.
But by (7), μl ¨μk μk whenever l>k . Hence, for any μl ∈ X such that l 6= k we have μl ¨μk μk,
and therefore μk ∈ X, for otherwise external stability condition would be violated. This proves
the induction step, and therefore completes the proof that X = D.
(Part 2) It is obvious that for any x,y ∈ S, x<yimplies x ¿ y. In our setup, however,
t h eo p p o s i t ei sa l s ot r u e ,s ox<yi fa n do n l yi fx ¿ y. To see this, suppose that x ¿ y;t a k ea
sequence of states and a sequence of coalitions as in Deﬁnition 11. Let k ≥ 0 be lowest number
such that xk+1 6= x. This means that x →Xk xk+1 (because xk = x)a n d∀i ∈ Xk : wx (i) <
wy (i).B yd e ﬁnition, x<y ;n o t ea l s ot h a tXk ∈ Wx,s i n c ex 6= xk+1.
To show that set D is consistent, consider some mapping φ that satisﬁes Axioms 1—3.T a k e
any x ∈ D, and then take any y ∈ S and any X ∈ C such that x →X y.L e tz = φ(y); then, as
follows from Axiom 1, either z = y or y ¿ z. Now consider two possibilities: x = y and x 6= y.I n
the ﬁrst case, x = y ∈ D,s oz = y = x.S i n c eX is nonempty, property ∃i ∈ X : wx (i) ≥ wz (i)
is satisﬁed. Now suppose that x 6= y;t h e nX ∈ Wx. On the other hand, z ∈ D.B u t i t i s
impossible that z Âx x,s i n c eb o t hx and z are stable (otherwise, Axiom 1 would be violated for
mapping φ), hence, in this case, ∃i ∈ X : wi (x) ≥ wi (z),t o o .
Now take some x/ ∈ D. We need to show that there exist y ∈ S and X ∈ C such that
x →X y and for any z ∈ D which satisﬁes that either z = y or y ¿ z, we necessarily have
∀i ∈ X : wi (x) <w i (z).T a k ey = φ(x) and X = {i ∈ I : wi (x) <w i (y)} ∈ Wx;t h e nx →X y.
Note that it is impossible that for some z ∈ D we have y ¿ z, for then y<z , and therefore
z Ây y, which would violate Axiom 1. Therefore, any z ∈ D such that either z = y or y ¿ z
61must satisfy z = y. But then, by our choice of X,w eh a v e∀i ∈ X : wi (x) <w i (z).T h i sp r o v e s
that D is indeed a consistent set.
To show that D is the largest consistent set, suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that the
largest consistent set is S 6= D.S i n c eD is consistent, we must have D ⊂ S. Consider sequence n
μ1,...,μ |S|
o
satisfying (7), and among all states in S \D6= ∅ pick state x = μk ∈ S \Dwith
the smallest number, i.e., such that if μl ∈ S \D ,t h e nl ≥ k. We now show that, according
to the deﬁnition of a consistent set, x/ ∈ S, which would contradict the assertion that state S
is consistent. Take some mapping φ that satisﬁes Axioms 1—3.N o w l e t y = φ(x) ∈ D and
X = {i ∈ I : wi (x) <w i (y)} ∈ Wx;t h e nx →X y and, since x/ ∈ D, y 6= x,w h i c hb y(7) implies
that y = μl for l<k .N o w i f f o r s o m e z ∈ S we have y ¿ z,t h e ny<z , and hence z Ây y,
which implies z = μj for some j<l<k .B u tt h e nz/ ∈ S\D, and therefore z ∈ D. However, it is
impossible that y,z ∈ D and z Ây y, as this would violate Axiom 1. Therefore, if for some z ∈ S
either z = y or y ¿ z,t h e ni nf a c tz = y. But for such z,w ed oh a v e∀i ∈ X : wi (x) <w i (z),
by construction of X. We get a contradiction, since by deﬁnition of a consistent set x/ ∈ S,w h i l e
we picked x ∈ S \D.T h i sp r o v e st h a tD is the largest consistent set.
(Part 3) By part 2,i fS is a consistent set, then S ⊂ D. Suppose that S 6= D, but S includes
a state which is not exogenously stable. Suppose x ∈ S is not exogenously stable and y ∈ D\S;
then x →X y for some X ∈ Wx.S i n c ex ∈ S,t h e r ee x i s t sz ∈ S where either z = y or y ¿ z,
such that ∃i ∈ X : wi (x) ≥ wi (z).B u ty ∈ D\S, and hence y ¿ z, which implies, as before,
y<zand z Ây y. However, this is impossible, since y,z ∈ D. This contradiction proves that if
S 6= D, S may not include any state which is not exogenously stable.
Consider, however, any S which consists of exogenously stable states only. Take any x ∈ S.
If y ∈ S and X ∈ C are such that x →X y,t h e nx = y. In that case, we can take z = y ∈ S and
ﬁnd that condition ∃i ∈ X : wi (x) ≥ wi (z) trivially holds. Now take any x/ ∈ S.C o n s i d e rt w o
possibilities. If state x is exogenously stable, then take X = I and y = x;t h e nx →X y.I ff o r
some z ∈ S we had y ¿ z, then, in particular, y →Y z for some Y ∈ C, which is incompatible
with z 6= y;a tt h es a m et i m e ,z = y is impossible, as z ∈ S and y = x/ ∈ S. This means that for
this y there does not exist z ∈ S such that either z = y or y ¿ z, and therefore x = y should not
be in S. Finally, suppose that x is not exogenously stable. Again, consider mapping φ satisfying
Axioms 1—3 and take y = φ(x) and X = {i ∈ I : wi (x) <w i (y)} ∈ Wx;t h e nx →X y.B y
the same reasoning as before, if for some z ∈ S either z = y or y ¿ z,t h e nz = y, because
y ¿ z would imply z Ây y for y,z ∈ D. But for such z,w eh a v e∀i ∈ X : wi (x) <w i (z) by
construction of X.T h i sp r o v e st h a tS is indeed a consistent set, which completes the proof.
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